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Recursos bibliográficos en papel y digitales -
- libros, artículos de revistas,
ponencias de eventos, etc. -
» Resultado:
5 registros
| Registro 1 de 5 |
| Autor: |
Akpalu, Wisdom - Bitew, Worku T. |
| Título: |
Externalities and foreign capital in aquaculture production in developing countries |
| Fuente: |
Environment and Development Economics. v.23, n.2. Beijer Institute of Ecological Economics; Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences |
| Páginas: |
pp. 198-215 |
| Año: |
apr. 2018 |
| Resumen: |
Most developing countries are increasingly depending on freshwater based aquaculture to supplement the declining catch from capture fisheries. Yet the competition between capture fisheries and cage culture for space, pollution generated by cage culture, and fish markets interaction effects are hardly conceptualized in a bioeconomic framework. Furthermore, the economic viability of cage culture depends on substantial investment thresholds, engendering foreign direct investment in the industry in developing countries. This paper develops a conceptual model for fresh-water-based aquaculture that accounts for these effects. We found that a Pigouvian tax (optimum ad valorem tax) that corrects the externalities depends on economic and biological parameters in both fisheries. Correcting for the externalities results in a reduction in aquaculture production but not optimum wild catch. Furthermore, with foreign capital in aquaculture, the Pigouvian tax equals the ratio of net to total benefit from aquaculture. Numerical values are used to illustrate the results. |
| Palabras clave: |
EXTERNALIDADES |
CAPITAL EXTRANJERO |
PESQUERIAS |
PESCA DE AGUA DULCE | |
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA E + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 2 de 5 |
| Autor: |
Akpalu, Wisdom - Normanyo, Ametefee K |
| Título: |
Illegal fishing and catch potentials among small-scale fishers: application of an endogenous Switching regression model |
| Fuente: |
Environment and Development Economics. v.19, n.2. Beijer Institute of Ecological Economics; Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences |
| Páginas: |
pp. 156-172 |
| Año: |
Apr. 2014 |
| Resumen: |
Capture fish stocks are facing an increasing threat of extinction, partly due to the use of illegal fishing methods. In developing coastal countries-where fishing activities are the mainstay of the population along the coast-livelihoods are being directly threatened. Although a number of studies exist on fishing regulations and those who violate them, little has been done on the relationship between intrinsic catch potentials/fishing skills and illegal fishing behavior. Using data on violations of light attraction regulation among small-scale fishers in Ghana, our results show that the risk of punishment, the amount of fishing experience, the skipper’s age, and religious norms all influence the decision to violate fishing regulations. Most importantly, we found that violators and non-violators have different fishing skills. Consequently, policies targeting illegal fishing must focus on equalizing efficiency and/or fishing skills among the fishermen as well as on traditional variables that influence violation decisions. |
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA E + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 3 de 5 |
| Autor: |
Akpalu, Wisdom - Vondolia, Godwin K. |
| Título: |
Bioeconomic model of spatial fishery management in developing countries |
| Fuente: |
Environment and Development Economics. v.17, n.2. Beijer Institute of Ecological Economics; Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences |
| Páginas: |
pp. 145-161 |
| Año: |
Apr. 2012 |
| Resumen: |
Fishers in developing countries do not have the resources to acquire advanced technologies to exploit offshore fish stocks. As a result, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea requires countries to sign partnership agreements with distant water fishing nations to exploit offshore stocks. However, for migratory stocks, the offshore may serve as a natural marine reserve (i.e., a source) to the inshore (i.e., sink); hence these partnership agreements generate a spatial externality. In this paper, we present a bioeconomic model in which a social planner uses a landing tax (ad valorem tax) to internalize this spatial externality. We found that the tax must reflect the biological connectivity between the two patches, intrinsic growth rate, the price of fish and cost per unit effort. The results are empirically illustrated using data on Ghana. |
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA E + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 4 de 5 |
| Autor: |
Akpalu, Wisdom - Muchapondwa, Edwin - Zikhali, Precious |
| Título: |
Can the restrictive harvest period policy conserve mopane worms in southern Africa? : a bioeconomic modelling approach |
| Fuente: |
Environment and Development Economics. v.14, n.5. Beijer Institute of Ecological Economics; Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences |
| Páginas: |
pp. 587-600 |
| Año: |
Oct. 2009 |
| Resumen: |
The mopane worm, which is the caterpillar form of the Saturnid moth Imbrasia belina Westwood, is - like other edible insects and caterpillars - a vital source of protein in southern African countries. The worms live and graze on mopane trees, which have alternative uses. With increasing commercialization of the worm, its management, which was hitherto organized as a common property resource, has been degraded to almost open access. This paper uses a bioeconomic modelling approach to show that for some optimal allocation of the mopane forest stock, the restrictive harvest period policy advocated by community leaders may not lead to sustainable harvesting of the worm. |
| Palabras clave: |
COSECHA |
RECURSOS NATURALES |
POLITICA |
GUSANOS |
BIOECONOMIA |
|
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA E + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 5 de 5 |
| Autor: |
Akpalu, Wisdom - |
| Título: |
Fishing regulations, individual discount rate, and fisherman behaviour in a developing country fishery |
| Fuente: |
Environment and Development Economics. v.13, n.5. Beijer Institute of Ecological Economics; Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences |
| Páginas: |
pp. 591-606 |
| Año: |
2008 |
| Resumen: |
Studies of compliance with fishing regulations have been based on fishery crimes where the offender faces a one-period decision problem of maximizing an expected utility. Moreover, the returns from the crimes are uncertain because the offender may lose them if caught. This paper extends these models by considering a fishery crime that generates a flow of returns until the offender is caught and then punished. Consequently, it incorporates into the existing model the influence of dynamic deterrence in which the discount rate affects violation levels. The predictions of the model are tested on data from an artisanal fishery in Ghana. |
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA E + datos de Fuente |
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