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Recursos bibliográficos en papel y digitales -
- libros, artículos de revistas,
ponencias de eventos, etc. -
» Resultado:
10 registros
| Registro 1 de 10 |
| Autor: |
Alesina, Alberto - |
| Título: |
Estados demasiado grandes y demasiado chicos |
| Fuente: |
Revista Internacional de Presupuesto Público. año 27, n.42. Asociación Internacional de Presupuesto Público, ASIP |
| Páginas: |
pp. 123-145 |
| Año: |
mar.-abr. 2000 |
| Palabras clave: |
SECTOR PUBLICO |
GASTOS PUBLICOS |
INGRESOS PUBLICOS |
POLITICA FISCAL |
|
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA R + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 2 de 10 |
| Autor: |
Alesina, Alberto - Hausmann, Ricardo - Hommes, Rudolf - Stein, Ernesto - |
| Título: |
Instituciones presupuestarias y desempeño fiscal en América Latina |
| En: |
Seminario sobre reglas macro-fiscales, instituciones e instrumentos presupuestarios plurianuales. Buenos Aires, 10-12 mayo 1999 |
| Institución patroc.: |
Argentina; Ministerio de Economía; Secretaría de Hacienda |
| Ciudad y Editorial: |
Buenos Aires : el Ministerio |
| Páginas: |
pp. 237-273 |
| Año: |
2000 |
| Palabras clave: |
PRESUPUESTO |
POLITICA FISCAL |
REGLAS MACRO-FISCALES |
DESEMPENO FISCAL | |
| Solicitar por: |
CONGRESOS 00095 |
| Registro 3 de 10 |
| Autor: |
Alesina, Alberto - Spolaore, Enrico - Wacziarg, Romain |
| Título: |
Economic Integration and Political Disintegration |
| Fuente: |
American Economic Review. v.90, n.5. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: |
pp. 1276-96 |
| Año: |
Dec. 2000 |
| Resumen: |
In a world of trade restrictions, large countries enjoy economic benefits, because political boundaries determine the size of the market. Under free trade and global markets even relatively small cultural, linguistic or ethnic groups can benefit from forming small, homogeneous political jurisdictions. This paper provides a formal model of the relationship between openness and the equilibrium number and size of countries, and successfully tests two implications of the model. Firstly, the economic benefits of country size are mediated by the degree of openness to trade. Secondly, the history of nation-state creations and secessions is influenced by the trade regime. |
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 4 de 10 |
| Autor: |
Alesina, Alberto - Perotti, Roberto - |
| Título: |
The Welfare State and Competitiveness |
| Fuente: |
American Economic Review. v.87, n.5. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: |
pp. 921-39 |
| Año: |
Dec. 1997 |
| Resumen: |
In all industrial countries, fiscal policy is increasingly about redistribution. In this paper, the authors study redistribution across different types of agents in a world characterized by the presence of labor unions and distortionary taxation. They show that an increase in transfers financed by distortionary taxation has nonlinear effects on unit labor costs relative to the other countries, depending on the degree of centralization of the wage-setting process in the labor market. The authors find considerable empirical support for the model in a sample of fourteen OECD countries. |
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
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