-
Recursos bibliográficos en papel y digitales -
- libros, artículos de revistas,
ponencias de eventos, etc. -
» Resultado: 2 registros
| Registro 1 de 2 | |
| Autor: | Allen, Jeffrey-W - McConnell, John-J - |
| Título: | Equity Carve-Outs and Managerial Discretion |
| Fuente: | Journal of Finance. v.53, n.1. American Finance Association |
| Páginas: | pp. 163-86 |
| Año: | Feb. 1998 |
| Resumen: | This study proposes a managerial discretion hypothesis of equity carve-outs in which managers value control over assets and are reluctant to carve out subsidiaries. Thus, managers undertake carve-outs only when the firm is capital constrained. Consistent with this hypothesis, firms that carve out subsidiaries exhibit poor operating performance and high leverage prior to carve-outs. Also consistent with this hypothesis, in carve-outs wherein funds raised are used to pay down debt, the average excess stock return of +6.63 percent is significantly greater than the average excess stock return of -0.01 percent for carve-outs wherein funds are retained for investment purposes. |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA J + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 2 de 2 | |
| Autor: | Allen, Jeffrey-W - |
| Título: | Capital Markets and Corporate Structure: The Equity Carve-Outs of Thermo Electron |
| Fuente: | Journal of Financial Economics. v.48, n.1. Elsevier Science |
| Páginas: | pp. 99-124 |
| Año: | Apr. 1998 |
| Resumen: | This paper examines the innovative corporate structure of Thermo Electron Corporation which holds controlling interests in eleven units taken public in equity carve-outs. Carve-outs subject units of the company to the scrutiny of the capital markets, allow the compensation contracts of unit managers to be based on market performance, and shift capital acquisition and investment decisions from centralized control to unit managers. Thermo carve-outs substantially increase capital and R&D expenditures following carve-outs and generate significant value from their capital investments. Since the first carve-out in 1983, gains to shareholders have been substantially greater than industry and market benchmarks. |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA J + datos de Fuente |
*** No hay más registros para visualizar ***
>> Nueva búsqueda <<