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Recursos bibliográficos en papel y digitales -
- libros, artículos de revistas,
ponencias de eventos, etc. -
» Resultado:
5 registros
| Registro 1 de 5 |
| Autor: |
Ball, Laurence - |
| Título: |
Credible Disinflation with Staggered Price-Setting |
| Fuente: |
American Economic Review. v.84, n.1. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: |
pp. 282-89 |
| Año: |
Mar. 1994 |
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 2 de 5 |
| Autor: |
Ball, Laurence - Cecchetti, Stephen-G - |
| Título: |
Wage Indexation and Discretionary Monetary Policy |
| Fuente: |
American Economic Review. v.81, n.5. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: |
pp. 1310-19 |
| Año: |
Dec. 1991 |
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 3 de 5 |
| Autor: |
Ball, Laurence - Romer, David - |
| Título: |
Sticky Prices as Coordination Failure |
| Fuente: |
American Economic Review. v.81, n.3. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: |
pp. 539-52 |
| Año: |
June 1991 |
| Resumen: |
This paper links the "coordination failure" and "menu cost" approaches to the microeconomic foundations of Keynesian macroeconomics. If a firm’s desired price is increasing in others’ prices, then the gain from price adjustment after a nominal shock is greater if others adjust. This "strategic complementarity" leads to multiple equilibria in the degree of rigidity. Welfare may be much higher in the equilibria with less rigidity. Thus, nominal rigidity arises from a failure to coordinate price changes. |
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 4 de 5 |
| Autor: |
Ball, Laurence - Cecchetti, Stephen-G - |
| Título: |
Imperfect Information and Staggered Price Setting |
| Fuente: |
American Economic Review. v.78, n.5. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: |
pp. 999-1018 |
| Año: |
Dec. 1988 |
| Resumen: |
Many Keynesian macroeconomic models are based on the assumption that firms change prices at different times. This paper presents an explanation for this "staggered" price setting. The authors develop a model in which firms have imperfect knowledge of the current state of the economy and gain information by observing the prices set by others. This gives each firm an incentive to set its price shortly after other firms set theirs. Staggering can be the equilibrium outcome. In addition, the information gains can make staggering socially optimal even though it increases aggregate fluctuations. |
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 5 de 5 |
| Autor: |
Ball, Laurence-Markham |
| Título: |
Externalities from Contract Length |
| Fuente: |
American Economic Review. v.77, n.4. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: |
pp. 615-29 |
| Año: |
Sept. 1987 |
| Resumen: |
An increase in the length of a firm’s labor contract contributes to rigidity in the aggregate price level. This increases the variance of aggregate demand but decreases the variance of other firms’ real wages. Under certain conditions, the net effect is to increase the variance of other firms’ employment. This negative externality implies that the equilibrium contract length in a decentralized economy is greater than the social optimum-in other words, wages are too rigid. |
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
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