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» Resultado: 2 registros
| Registro 1 de 2 | |
| Autor: | Besfamille, Martin - De Donder, Philippe - Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie |
| Título: | The Political Economy of the (Weak) Enforcement of Indirect Taxes |
| En: | Jornadas Internacionales de Finanzas Públicas, 44. Córdoba, 21-23 septiembre 2011 |
| Institución patroc.: | Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas; Consejo Profesional de Ciencias Económicas de la Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires |
| Ciudad y Editorial: | Córdoba : UNC |
| Páginas: | 34 p. |
| Año: | 2011 |
| Resumen: | The objective of this paper is to understand the determinants of the enforcement level of indirect taxation in a positive setting. We build a sequential game where individuals, who diÏer in their willingness to pay for a taxed good, vote over the enforcement level. Firms then compete à la Cournot and choose the fraction of sales taxes to evade. We assume in most of the paper that the tax rate is set exogenously. Voters face the following trade-oÏ: more enforcement increases tax collection but also increases the consumer price of the goods sold in an imperfectly competitive market. We obtain that the equilibriumenforcement level is the onemost-preferred by the individual with the median willingness to pay, that it is not aÏected by the structure of the market (number of firms) and the firms marginal cost, and that it decreases with the resource cost of evasion and with the tax rate. We also compare the enforcement level chosen by majority voting with the utilitarian level. In the last section, we endogenize the tax rate by assuming that individuals vote simultaneously over tax rate and enforcement level. We prove the existence of a Condorcet winner and show that it entails full enforcement (i.e., no tax evasion at equilibrium). The existence of markets with less than full enforcement then depends crucially on the fact that tax rates are not tailored to each market individually. |
| Palabras clave: | EVASION FISCAL | COMPETENCIA IMPERFECTA | |
| Solicitar por: | MULTI CD 00015/44 |
| Registro 2 de 2 | |
| Autor: | Bellofatto, Andrés - Besfamille, Martín - |
| Título: | Do bailouts have to be banned? The optimal degree of decentralization in federations with uniform national taxation and moral hazard |
| En: | Jornadas Internacionales de Finanzas Públicas, 43. Córdoba, 22-24 septiembre 2010 |
| Institución patroc.: | Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas; Consejo Profesional de Ciencias Económicas de la Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires |
| Ciudad y Editorial: | Córdoba : UNC |
| Páginas: | 26 p. |
| Año: | 2010 |
| Resumen: | This paper presents a theoretical model showing that, contrary to the common wisdom, bailouts are not so harmful for efficiency in federations and also that tax decentralization may deteriorate the efficiency of local investment. |
| Palabras clave: | FEDERALISMO | POLITICA FISCAL | FEDERALISMO FISCAL | DESCENTRALIZACION | PRESUPUESTO PUBLICO | RESCATE FINANCIERO | |
| Solicitar por: | MULTI CD 00015/43 |
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