|
|
-
Recursos bibliográficos en papel y digitales -
- libros, artículos de revistas,
ponencias de eventos, etc. -
» Resultado:
6 registros
| Registro 1 de 6 |
| Autor: |
Bolton, Patrick - Freixas, Xavier |
| Título: |
Equity, bonds, and bank debt : capital structure and financial market equilibrium under asymmetric information |
| Fuente: |
Journal of Political Economy. v.108, n.2. The University of Chicago Press |
| Páginas: |
pp. 324-351 |
| Año: |
Apr. 2000 |
| Resumen: |
This paper proposes a model of financial markets and corporate finance, with asymmetric information and no taxes, where equity issues, bank debt, and bund financing coexist in equilibrium. The relationship banking aspect of financial intermediation is emphasized firms turn to banks as a source of investment mainly because banks are good at helping them through times of financial distress. This financial flexibility is costly since banks face costs of capital themselves (which they attempt to minimize through securitization). To avoid this intermediation cost, firms may turn to bond or equity financing, but bonds imply an inefficient liquidation cast and equity an informational dilution cost. We show that in equilibrium the riskier firms prefer bank loans, the safer ones tap the bond markets, and the ones in between prefer to issue both equity, and bonds. This segmentation is broadly consistent with stylized facts |
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA J + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 2 de 6 |
| Autor: |
Bolton, Patrick - von-Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig |
| Título: |
Blocks, Liquidity, and Corporate Control |
| Fuente: |
Journal of Finance. v.53, n.1. American Finance Association |
| Páginas: |
pp. 1-25 |
| Año: |
Feb. 1998 |
| Resumen: |
This paper develops a simple model of corporate ownership structure in which costs and benefits of ownership concentration are analyzed. The model compares the liquidity benefits obtained through dispersed corporate ownership with the benefits from efficient management control achieved by some degree of ownership concentration. The paper reexamines the free-rider problem in corporate control in the presence of liquidity trading, derives predictions for the trade and pricing of blocks, and provides criteria for the optimal choice of ownership structure. |
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA J + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 3 de 6 |
| Autor: |
Bolton, Patrick - Scharfstein, David-S - |
| Título: |
Corporate Finance, the Theory of the Firm, and Organizations |
| Fuente: |
Journal of Economic Perspectives. v.12, n.4. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: |
pp. 95-114 |
| Año: |
fall 1998 |
| Resumen: |
Much of the modern research on firm boundaries, following Ronald Coase (1937), assumes that firms are run by owner-managers. This contrasts with the agency literature, following Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means (1932), that emphasizes the problems that arise when managers are not owners. In this paper, the authors argue that a richer theory of the firm should integrate Coase and Berle and Means. They illustrate this point by reexamining the oft-cited merger of General Motors and Fisher Body. The authors also show how linking these literatures can be used to understand one of the key roles of corporate headquarters, the allocation of capital. |
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA J + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 4 de 6 |
| Autor: |
Bolton, Patrick - Roland, Gerard - |
| Título: |
Distributional Conflicts, Factor Mobility, and Political Integration |
| Fuente: |
American Economic Review. v.86, n.2. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: |
pp. 99-104 |
| Año: |
May 1996 |
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 5 de 6 |
| Autor: |
Bolton, Patrick - Scharfstein, David-S - |
| Título: |
A Theory of Predation Based on Agency Problems in Financial Contracting |
| Fuente: |
American Economic Review. v.80, n.1. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: |
pp. 93-106 |
| Año: |
Mar. 1990 |
| Resumen: |
By committing to terminate funding if a firm’s performance is poor, investors can mitigate managerial incentive problems. These optimal financial constraints, however, encourage rivals to ensure that a firm’s performance is poor; this raises the chance that the financial constraints become binding and induce exit. The authors analyze the optimal financial contract in light of this predatory threat. The optimal contract balances the benefits of deterring predation by relaxing financial constraints against the cost of exacerbating incentive problems. |
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
>> Nueva
búsqueda
<<
Inicio
|
