MegaCatálogo Bibliográfico
Centro de Documentación. FCEyS. UNMdP

- Recursos bibliográficos en papel y digitales -
- libros, artículos de revistas, ponencias de eventos, etc. -

» Resultado: 3 registros

Registro 1 de 3
Autor: Bulow, Jeremy - Klemperer, Paul - 
Título: Auctions versus Negotiations
Fuente: American Economic Review. v.86, n.1. American Economic Association
Páginas: pp. 180-94
Año: Mar. 1996
Resumen: Which is the more profitable way to sell a company: an auction with no reserve price or an optimally structured negotiation with one less bidder? The authors show, under reasonable assumptions, that the auction is always preferable when bidders’ signals are independent. For affiliated signals, the result holds under certain restrictions on the seller’s choice of negotiating mechanism. The result suggests that the value of negotiating skill is small relative to the value of additional competition. The paper also shows how the analogies between monopoly theory and auction theory can help derive new results in auction theory.
Solicitar por: HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente
Registro 2 de 3
Autor: Bulow, Jeremy - Rogoff, Kenneth - 
Título: Cleaning Up Third World Debt without Getting Taken to the Cleaners
Fuente: Journal of Economic Perspectives. v.4, n.1. American Economic Association
Páginas: pp. 31-42
Año: winter 1990
Solicitar por: HEMEROTECA J + datos de Fuente
Registro 3 de 3
Autor: Bulow, Jeremy - Rogoff, Kenneth - 
Título: Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget?
Fuente: American Economic Review. v.79, n.1. American Economic Association
Páginas: pp. 43-50
Año: Mar. 1989
Resumen: This paper shows that, under fairly general conditions, lending to small countries must be supported by the direct sanctions available to creditors and cannot be supported by a country’s "reputation for repayment." This distinction is critically important for understanding the true underlying nature of sovereign lending contracts and for comparing policy alternatives for dealing with the developing country debt problem.
Solicitar por: HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente

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