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Recursos bibliográficos en papel y digitales -
- libros, artículos de revistas,
ponencias de eventos, etc. -
» Resultado: 3 registros
| Registro 1 de 3 | |
| Autor: | Bosello, Francesco - Carraro, Carlo - De Cian, Enrica |
| Título: | Adaptation can help mitigation: an integrated approach to post-2012 climate policy |
| Fuente: | Environment and Development Economics. v.18, n.3. Beijer Institute of Ecological Economics; Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences |
| Páginas: | pp. 270-290 |
| Año: | June 2013 |
| Resumen: | This paper analyzes the optimal mix of adaptation and mitigation expenditures in a cost-effective setting, in which countries cooperate to achieve a long-term stabilization target (550 CO2-eq). It uses an Integrated Assessment Model (AD-WITCH) that describes the relationships between different adaptation modes (reactive and anticipatory), mitigation and capacity building to analyze the optimal portfolio of adaptation measures. Results show that the optimal intertemporal distribution of climate policy measures is characterized by early investments in mitigation followed by large adaptation expenditures a few decades later. Hence, the possibility of adapting does not justify postponing mitigation. Moreover, a climate change policy combining mitigation and adaptation is less costly than mitigation alone. In this sense mitigation and adaptation are shown to be strategic complements rather than mutually exclusive. |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA E + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 2 de 3 | |
| Autor: | Bosello, Francesco - Carraro, Carlo - Galeotti, Marzio |
| Título: | The double dividend issue : modeling strategies and empirical findings |
| Fuente: | Environment and Development Economics. v.6, n.1. Beijer Institute of Ecological Economics; Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences |
| Páginas: | pp. 9-45 |
| Año: | Feb. 2001 |
| Palabras clave: | MODELOS | IMPUESTOS | MEDIO AMBIENTE | MODELACION ESTRATEGICA | |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA E + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 3 de 3 | |
| Autor: | Carraro, Carlo - |
| Título: | Modelling International Policy Games: Lessons from European Monetary Coordination |
| Fuente: | Empirica. v.24, n.3 |
| Páginas: | pp. 163-77 |
| Año: | 1997 |
| Resumen: | Most international monetary policy games are modelled as prisoners’ dilemma games. Political scientists suggest however that other game-theoretic structures (chicken, stag-hunt and deadlock games) could be more appropriate to describe international monetary coordination. This paper provides some empirical evidence on this issue, by studying the case of European monetary coordination from 1979 to 1989. First, central banks’ and governments’ preferences are revealed through an analysis of their actual behaviour. Then, the dynamic game describing policymakers’ interactions is simulated under alternative institutional arrangements: coordination, defection, sub-group coalitions, etc. The main conclusion is that the stylised facts derived from those experiments seem not to be consistent with the implications of the prisoners’ dilemma framework. Consistency is instead found with the features of a stag-hunt game. |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA E + datos de Fuente |
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