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Recursos bibliográficos en papel y digitales -
- libros, artículos de revistas,
ponencias de eventos, etc. -
» Resultado: 4 registros
| Registro 1 de 4 | |
| Autor: | Escobar, Ninel - Chávez, Carlos - |
| Título: | Monitoring, firms’ compliance and imposition of fines: evidence from the Federal Industrial Inspection Program in Mexico City |
| Fuente: | Environment and Development Economics. v.18, n.6. Beijer Institute of Ecological Economics; Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences |
| Páginas: | pp. 723-748 |
| Año: | Dec. 2013 |
| Resumen: | We analyze the performance of the Federal Industrial Inspection Program operated by the Federal Attorney for Environmental Protection (PROFEPA) in Mexico City. We seek to answer three questions: What drives the inspections? What determines non-compliance? And what drives imposition of fines? We use firm-level data that identify certain characteristics of the firms, PROFEPA’s inspections, compliance results and fines for all air polluting firms under the Program during the period January 2000-October 2008. We obtain three main results. First, PROFEPA’s inspections have focused on larger firms devoted to industrial activities located in poor and dense municipalities. Second, past inspections were significant and have a high marginal effect on compliance. Third, the severity of the infraction was not relevant to the decision to impose a fine but rather to its amount. |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA E + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 2 de 4 | |
| Autor: | Gómez, Walter - Yep, Sue - Chávez, Carlos - |
| Título: | Subsidios a hogares para inducir adopción de tecnologías de combustión de leña más eficiente y menos contaminantes: Simulación para el caso de Temuco y Padre Las Casas |
| Fuente: | Estudios de Economía. v.40, n.1. Universidad de Chile; Facultad de Economía y Negocios |
| Páginas: | pp. 21-52 |
| Año: | jun. 2013 |
| Resumen: | Estudiamos el efecto de un subsidio a hogares que incentive el cambio a equipos de combustión de leña más eficientes y menos contaminantes. Se comparan, mediante simulaciones numéricas, diversos diseños de subsidio respecto del impacto sobre emisiones, costo y los indicadores de costo-efectividad. Dos variables importantes para el éxito de un programa de subsidio son el tiempo de uso restante asignado a equipos antiguos, y el acceso de los hogares a financiar el copago. Se observa que para escenarios regulatorios y/o análisis de costos diferentes, los diseños con mejores índices de costo-efectividad también difieren. |
| Palabras clave: | SUBSIDIOS | POLITICA AMBIENTAL | CONTAMINACION URBANA | MEDIO AMBIENTE | COMBUSTIBLES | |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA ESPECIMENES E + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 3 de 4 | |
| Autor: | Dresdner, Jorge - Campos, Nélyda - Chávez, Carlos - |
| Título: | The impact of individual quotas on technical efficiency: does quality matter? |
| Fuente: | Environment and Development Economics. v.15, n.5. Beijer Institute of Ecological Economics; Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences |
| Páginas: | pp. 585-607 |
| Año: | Oct. 2010 |
| Resumen: | We estimate the technical efficiency gains of introducing individual quotas (IQs) in fisheries. Our estimates are based on two samples of vessels, considering a potential self-selection bias and controlling for quality changes in landings induced by the IQ system. The results suggest that the introduction of IQs has an important positive impact on fleet efficiency, and that properly measuring this impact requires controlling for the self-selection bias and quality changes induced by the regulatory shift. |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA E + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 4 de 4 | |
| Autor: | Chavez, Carlos A. - Villena, Mauricio G. - Stranlund, John K. |
| Título: | The choice of policy instruments to control pollution under costly enforcement and incomplete information |
| Fuente: | Journal of Applied Economics. v.12, n.22. Universidad del CEMA |
| Páginas: | pp. 207-227 |
| Año: | Nov. 2009 |
| Resumen: | We analyze the cost of enforcing a system of firm specific emissions standards vis a vis a transferable emissions permit system in the context of complete and incomplete information. We also examine the optimality of a transferable emissions permit system when abatement costs and enforcement costs are considered. We show that under incomplete information, regulation based on each firm-specific emissions standards cannot be less costly than a transferable emissions permit system. In addition, we find that the distribution of emissions that minimize aggregate program costs differ from the distribution of emissions generated by a competitive transferable emissions permit system. |
| Palabras clave: | POLITICA AMBIENTAL | RENTABILIDAD | CONTAMINACION | ANALISIS DE COSTOS | CONTROL | |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA J + datos de Fuente |
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