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Recursos bibliográficos en papel y digitales -
- libros, artículos de revistas,
ponencias de eventos, etc. -
» Resultado:
7 registros
| Registro 1 de 7 |
| Autor: |
Cukierman, Alex - Tommasi, Mariano - |
| Título: |
When Does It Take a Nixon to Go to China? |
| Fuente: |
American Economic Review. v.88, n.1. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: |
pp. 180-97 |
| Año: |
Mar. 1998 |
| Resumen: |
Substantial policy changes, like market-oriented reforms by populist parties and steps towards peace by ’hawks,’ are sometimes implemented by ’unlikely’ parties. To account for such episodes, this paper develops a framework in which incumbent politicians have better information about the state of the world than voters. The incumbent is unable to credibly transmit all this information since voters are also imperfectly informed about his ideology. The paper identifies conditions under which an incumbent party’s electoral prospects increase the more atypical the policy it proposes. Popular support for a policy, or its ’credibility,’ depends on the policymaker-policy pair. |
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 2 de 7 |
| Autor: |
Cukierman, Alex - Edwards, Sebastian - Tabellini, Guido - |
| Título: |
Seigniorage and Political Instability |
| Fuente: |
American Economic Review. v.82, n.3. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: |
pp. 537-55 |
| Año: |
June 1992 |
| Resumen: |
The importance of seigniorage relative to other sources of government revenue differs markedly across countries. This paper tries to explain this regularity by studying a political model of tax reform. The model implies that countries with a more unstable and polarized political system will have more inefficient tax structures and, thus, will rely more heavily on seigniorage. This prediction of the model is tested on cross-sectional data for seventy countries. The authors find that, after controlling for other variables, political instability is positively associated with seigniorage. |
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 3 de 7 |
| Autor: |
Cukierman, Alex - Meltzer, Allan-H - |
| Título: |
A Political Theory of Government Debt and Deficits in a Neo-Ricardian Framework |
| Fuente: |
American Economic Review. v.79, n.4. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: |
pp. 713-32 |
| Año: |
Sept. 1989 |
| Resumen: |
In the presence of different abilities, and therefore different bequests, some individuals are bequest constrained even in a neo-Ricardian world. Such individuals vote for taxes on future generations, through the issuance of bonds, thereby increasing their current consumption. This produces some crowding out of capital, reduces wage rates, and increases the interest rate. As a consequence, even unconstrained individuals are no longer indifferent to the size of government debt. The paper derives conditions that are conducive to larger debt and deficits when each of the living generations determines current taxes, social security benefits, and the national debt by majority rule. |
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 4 de 7 |
| Autor: |
Cukierman, Alex - Wachtel, Paul - |
| Título: |
Inflationary Expectations: Reply and Further Thoughts on Inflation Uncertainty |
| Fuente: |
American Economic Review. v.72, n.3. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: |
pp. 508-12 |
| Año: |
June 1982 |
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 5 de 7 |
| Autor: |
Cukierman, Alex - Wachtel, Paul - |
| Título: |
Differential Inflationary Expectations and the Variability of the Rate of Inflation: Theory and Evidence |
| Fuente: |
American Economic Review. v.69, n.4. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: |
pp. 595-609 |
| Año: |
Sept. 1979 |
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
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