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Recursos bibliográficos en papel y digitales -
- libros, artículos de revistas,
ponencias de eventos, etc. -
» Resultado:
5 registros
| Registro 1 de 5 |
| Autor: |
DeAngelo, Harry - DeAngelo, Linda - |
| Título: |
Ancient Redwoods and the Politics of Finance: The Hostile Takeover of the Pacific Lumber Company |
| Fuente: |
Journal of Financial Economics. v.47, n.1. Elsevier Science |
| Páginas: |
pp. 3-53 |
| Año: |
Jan. 1998 |
| Resumen: |
Pacific Lumber was acquired in 1986 by MAXXAM, whose decision to double Pacific Lumber’s harvest of old-growth redwoods precipitated eleven years of environmental protests. Intense media coverage blames the Drexel-financed takeover for threatening Headwaters Forest, the largest privately owned ancient redwood forest. This ’Wall Street greed’ portrayal aroused such public outrage that the Clinton administration agreed to pay $380 million for Headwaters weeks before the 1996 election. The authors establish that the threat to Headwaters is not attributable to MAXXAM’s junk bond-financed takeover. Government’s response to dramatic crises encourages interest groups to use emotional appeals to influence resource allocation. |
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA J + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 2 de 5 |
| Autor: |
DeAngelo, Harry - DeAngelo, Linda - Gilson, Stuart-C - |
| Título: |
Perceptions and the Politics of Finance: Junk Bonds and the Regulatory Seizure of First Capital Life |
| Fuente: |
Journal of Financial Economics. v.41, n.3. Elsevier Science |
| Páginas: |
pp. 475-511 |
| Año: |
July 1996 |
| Resumen: |
In May 1991, one month after seizing Executive Life, California regulators seized First Capital Life (FCLIC). Both insurers were Drexel clients with large junk bond holdings, and both had experienced ’bank runs.’ FCLIC’s run followed regulators’ televised comments that its poor condition necessitated a substantial cash infusion. Yet FCLIC’s statutory capital--with junk bonds, real estate, and mortgages marked to market--was far from lowest among major insurers with California policyholders. It becomes lowest if junk bonds ’alone’ are marked to market at year-end 1990 (ignoring larger market declines in real estate/mortgages and the junk bond market’s 21return in early 1991). Our findings suggest a regulatory bias against junk bonds in the political backlash against the 1980s. |
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA J + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 3 de 5 |
| Autor: |
DeAngelo, Harry - DeAngelo, Linda - Skinner, Douglas-J |
| Título: |
Reversal of Fortune: Dividend Signaling and the Disappearance of Sustained Earnings Growth |
| Fuente: |
Journal of Financial Economics. v.40, n.3. Elsevier Science |
| Páginas: |
pp. 341-71 |
| Año: |
Mar. 1996 |
| Resumen: |
The authors study the signaling content of managers’ dividend decisions for 145 NYSE firms whose annual earnings decline after nine or more consecutive years of growth. Using a variety of model specifications and definitions of favorable dividend signals, they find virtually no support for the notion that dividend decisions help identify firms with superior future earnings. Dividends tend not to be reliable signals because a behavioral bias (overoptimism) leads managers to overestimate future earnings when growth prospects fade and managers make only modest cash commitments when they increase dividends, undermining the reliability of such signals. |
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA J + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 4 de 5 |
| Autor: |
DeAngelo, Harry - DeAngelo, Linda - Gilson, Stuart-C - |
| Título: |
The Collapse of First Executive Corporation Junk Bonds, Adverse Publicity, and the ’Run on the Bank’ Phenomenon |
| Fuente: |
Journal of Financial Economics. v.36, n.3. Elsevier Science |
| Páginas: |
pp. 287-336 |
| Año: |
Dec. 1994 |
| Resumen: |
In April 1991, regulators seized the major subsidiaries of First Executive Corporation, an insurer that invested heavily in junk bonds. During the junk bond market turmoil of 1989-90, adverse publicity fueled a bank run at First Executive Corporation, forcing a $4 billion portfolio liquidation before the market rose 50-60 percent in 1991-92. More traditional insurers did not receive commensurate press coverage, despite their substantial exposure to real estate declines, which were roughly 2.5 times the junk bond decline. Seizure of First Executive Corporation’s subsidiaries was defensible, although First Executive Corporation would have become solvent within a year, given average junk bond market appreciation. |
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA J + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 5 de 5 |
| Autor: |
DeAngelo, Harry - |
| Título: |
Competition and Unanimity |
| Fuente: |
American Economic Review. v.71, n.1. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: |
pp. 18-27 |
| Año: |
Mar. 1981 |
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
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