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Recursos bibliográficos en papel y digitales - - libros, artículos de revistas,
ponencias de eventos, etc. -
» Resultado:
3 registros
Registro 1 de 3 |
Autor: |
Edlin, Aaron-S - Reichelstein, Stefan - |
Título: |
Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment |
Fuente: |
American Economic Review. v.86, n.3. American Economic Association |
Páginas: |
pp. 478-501 |
Año: |
June 1996 |
Resumen: |
In bilateral trading problems, the parties may be hesitant to make relationship-specific investments without adequate contractual protection. The authors postulate that the parties can sign noncontingent contracts prior to investing and can freely renegotiate them after information about the desirability of trade is revealed. They find that such contracts can induce one party to invest efficiently when courts impose either a breach remedy of specific performance or expectation damages. Moreover, specific performance can induce both parties to invest efficiently if a separability condition holds. Expectation damages, on the other hand, is poorly suited to solve bilateral investment problems. |
Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
Registro 2 de 3 |
Autor: |
Edlin, Aaron-S - Stiglitz, Joseph-E - |
Título: |
Discouraging Rivals: Managerial Rent-Seeking and Economic Inefficiencies |
Fuente: |
American Economic Review. v.85, n.5. American Economic Association |
Páginas: |
pp. 1301-12 |
Año: |
Dec. 1995 |
Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
Registro 3 de 3 |
Autor: |
Edlin, Aaron-S - |
Título: |
Is College Financial Aid Equitable and Efficient? |
Fuente: |
Journal of Economic Perspectives. v.7, n.2. American Economic Association |
Páginas: |
pp. 143-58 |
Año: |
spring 1993 |
Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA J + datos de Fuente |
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