MegaCatálogo Bibliográfico
Centro de Documentación. FCEyS. UNMdP

- Recursos bibliográficos en papel y digitales -
- libros, artículos de revistas, ponencias de eventos, etc. -

» Resultado: 12 registros

Registro 1 de 12
Autor: Borenstein, Severin - Farrell, Joseph - 
Título: Is Cost-Cutting Evidence of X-Inefficiency?
Fuente: American Economic Review. v.90, n.2. American Economic Association
Páginas: pp. 224-27
Año: May 2000
Solicitar por: HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente
Registro 2 de 12
Autor: Farrell, Joseph - Rabin, Matthew - 
Título: Cheap Talk
Fuente: Journal of Economic Perspectives. v.10, n.3. American Economic Association
Páginas: pp. 103-18
Año: summer 1996
Resumen: Economists often ask how private information is shared through markets, costly signaling, and other mechanisms. Yet most information sharing is done through ordinary, informal talk. Economists are inconsistent in their view of such ’cheap talk’: sometimes it is supposed that communication generally leads to efficient equilibria; other times it is supposed that since ’talk is cheap,’ it is never credible. The authors think both views are wrong. In this paper, they describe what some recent research in game theory teaches about when people will convey private information by cheap talk.
Solicitar por: HEMEROTECA J + datos de Fuente
Registro 3 de 12
Autor: Farrell, Joseph - 
Título: Talk Is Cheap
Fuente: American Economic Review. v.85, n.2. American Economic Association
Páginas: pp. 186-90
Año: May 1995
Solicitar por: HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente
Registro 4 de 12
Autor: Besen, Stanley-M - Farrell, Joseph - 
Título: Choosing How to Compete: Strategies and Tactics in Standardization
Fuente: Journal of Economic Perspectives. v.8, n.2. American Economic Association
Páginas: pp. 117-31
Año: spring 1994
Resumen: In a network industry, each firm must decide whether or not it wants its product to be compatible with those of rivals. This horizontal compatibility strategy determines whether competition is a battle to establish a standard or the more conventional competition within a standard. The two forms of competition involve different tactics and may differ in the extent to which they dissipate industry profits. In some cases, all firms in an industry may prefer the same form of competition. In other cases, firms may prefer different forms of competition and either may prevail.
Solicitar por: HEMEROTECA J + datos de Fuente
Registro 5 de 12
Autor: Farrell, Joseph - Shapiro, Carl - 
Título: Horizontal Mergers: Reply
Fuente: American Economic Review. v.81, n.4. American Economic Association
Páginas: pp. 1007-11
Año: Sept. 1991
Solicitar por: HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente

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