-
Recursos bibliográficos en papel y digitales -
- libros, artículos de revistas,
ponencias de eventos, etc. -
» Resultado: 3 registros
| Registro 1 de 3 | |
| Autor: | Fernandez, Raquel - Rogerson, Richard - |
| Título: | Public Education and Income Distribution: A Dynamic Quantitative Evaluation of Education-Finance Reform |
| Fuente: | American Economic Review. v.88, n.4. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: | pp. 813-33 |
| Año: | Sept. 1998 |
| Resumen: | Many states are implementing school-finance reforms which will have complex effects on income distribution, intergenerational income mobility, and welfare. This paper analyzes the static and dynamic effects of such reforms by constructing a dynamic general equilibrium model of public-education provision and calibrating it using U.S. data. The authors examine the consequences of a reform of a locally financed system to a state-financed system which equalizes expenditures per student across districts. They find that this policy increases both average income and the share of income spent on education. Steady-state welfare increases by 3.2 percent of steady-state income. |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 2 de 3 | |
| Autor: | Fernandez, Raquel - Rodrik, Dani - |
| Título: | Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty |
| Fuente: | American Economic Review. v.81, n.5. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: | pp. 1146-55 |
| Año: | Dec. 1991 |
| Resumen: | Why do governments so often fail to adopt policies that economists consider to be efficiency-enhancing? The authors answer to this question relies on uncertainty regarding the distribution of gains and losses from reform. They show that there is a bias toward the status quo (and, hence, against efficiency-enhancing reforms) whenever some of the individual gainers and losers from reform cannot be identified beforehand. There are reforms which, once adopted, will receive adequate political support but would have failed to carry the day ex ante. The argument does not rely on risk aversion, irrationality, or hysteresis due to sunk costs. |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 3 de 3 | |
| Autor: | Fernandez, Raquel - Glazer, Jacob - |
| Título: | Striking for a Bargain between Two Completely Informed Agents |
| Fuente: | American Economic Review. v.81, n.1. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: | pp. 240-52 |
| Año: | Mar. 1991 |
| Resumen: | This paper models the wage-contract negotiation procedure between a union and a firm as a sequential bargaining process in which the union must decide, in each period, whether or not to strike for the duration of that period. We show that there exist subgame-perfect equilibria in which the union engages in several periods of strikes prior to reaching a final agreement, although both parties are completely rational and fully informed. This has implications for other inefficient phenomena, such as tariff wars, debt negotiations, and wars in general. We characterize the set of equilibria, show that strikes can occur in real time, and discuss extensions of the model, such as lockouts and the possibility of multiple recontracting opportunities. |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
*** No hay más registros para visualizar ***
>> Nueva búsqueda <<