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Recursos bibliográficos en papel y digitales -
- libros, artículos de revistas,
ponencias de eventos, etc. -
» Resultado: 2 registros
| Registro 1 de 2 | |
| Autor: | Thanh Thuy, Pham Thi - Flaaten, Ola - Skonhoft, Anders |
| Título: | Middlemen: good for resources and fishermen? |
| Fuente: | Environment and Development Economics. v.24, n.5. Beijer Institute of Ecological Economics; Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences |
| Páginas: | pp. 437-456 |
| Año: | oct. 2019 |
| Resumen: | This paper studies the role of middlemen in open-access fisheries and how the organization of the supply chains affects resource exploitation and the level and distribution of economic rent. Imperfect competition among middlemen can help ensure that fish stocks are not depleted, which is typically the case in open-access fisheries with competitive markets. Middlemen with market power can also induce higher economic rent for the supply chain in total, but these rents mainly benefit the middlemen. The supply chains of inshore anchovy and offshore skipjack tuna fisheries in Vietnam are used as empirical examples. The analysis shows that in the anchovy supply chain, the middlemen have insignificant market power and the stock is being overexploited. In the skipjack tuna supply chain, the middlemen have oligopsony power and the stock is higher than the level that produces maximum sustainable yield. |
| Palabras clave: | PESCA | ANCHOA | CADENA DE SUMINISTROS | DISTRIBUCION DE LA RENTA | PRECIOS | INTERMEDIARIOS | |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA E + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 2 de 2 | |
| Autor: | Flaaten, Ola - Heen, Knut - Salvanes, Kjell-G - |
| Título: | The Invisible Resource Rent in Limited Entry and Quota Managed Fisheries: The Case of Norwegian Purse Seine Fisheries |
| Fuente: | Marine Resource Economics. v.10, n.4. Marine Resources Foundation |
| Páginas: | pp. 341-56 |
| Año: | winter 1995 |
| Resumen: | This paper tests empirically to what extent the rent in a limited entry and quota managed fishery is capitalized in the value of a vessel license. This is done by comparing the profitability of Norwegian purse seine vessels which received their licenses for free, to the profitability of vessels whose licenses were purchased along with the vessel. In a sample of forty-three vessels, thirty-one had obtained their licenses for free when the licensing system was introduced in 1973, whereas twelve owners had bought licensed vessels later on. Costs and earnings data for 1983 and 1984 show that those vessels which received free licenses have a significantly higher profitability than the other vessel group. The main reason for this is that the owners who bought licensed vessels had the highest capital costs. Policy implications of these findings are indicated. |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA M + datos de Fuente |
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