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» Resultado: 2 registros
| Registro 1 de 2 | |
| Autor: | Forteza, Alvaro - Rossi, Ianina |
| Título: | The contribution of government transfer programs to inequality. A net-benefit approach |
| Fuente: | Journal of Applied Economics. v.12, n.1. Universidad del CEMA |
| Páginas: | pp. 55-67 |
| Año: | May 2009 |
| Resumen: | The contribution of government transfer programs to inequality is often assessed by analyzing to what extent the benefits paid go to lower income families. Several analysts have found that some key government transfers actually go mostly to middle and high income families and thus contribute to greater inequality. We argue in this paper that the impact of these programs on inequality should be evaluated considering the benefits received net of the taxes paid by households to finance the programs, since higher income households receive higher benefits but they also pay higher taxes. We illustrate this approach by estimating the impact of three government programs on inequality in Uruguay and show that the conclusions are different depending on whether we use gross or net benefits in the estimation. |
| Palabras clave: | TRANSFERENCIA DE RECURSOS REALES | ASIGNACION DE RECURSOS | REDISTRIBUCION DEL INGRESO | DESIGUALDAD ECONOMICA | IMPUESTOS | METODOLOGIA | MODELOS ECONOMETRICOS | ANALISIS ECONOMETRICO | INGRESOS PUBLICOS | PENSIONES DE JUBILACION | INGRESOS DE HOGARES | INGRESO PER CAPITA | HACIENDA PUBLICA | |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA J + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 2 de 2 | |
| Autor: | Forteza, Alvaro - |
| Título: | Transaction Costs and Overinsurance in Government Transfer Policy |
| Fuente: | Journal of Applied Economics. v.2, n.2. Universidad del CEMA |
| Páginas: | pp. 311-336 |
| Año: | Nov. 1999 |
| Resumen: | Benevolent governments lacking commitment ability provide too much insurance, if opportunistic private agents free ride on the governmentïs concern and exert too little effort expecting government assistance. Yet, the costs of implementing the transfer policy work as a commitment device, alleviating the credibility problem. Indeed, despite of the lack of commitment capacity, the government might provide incomplete insurance because of these transaction costs. Therefore, transaction costs can increase welfare by resolving the dynamic inconsistency faced by a welfare maximizing policymaker. |
| Palabras clave: | SEGURIDAD | POLITICA | ESTADO | ECONOMIA DEL BIENESTAR | GOBIERNO | INCENTIVOS | SEGUROS | |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA J + datos de Fuente |
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