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Recursos bibliográficos en papel y digitales -
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» Resultado: 3 registros
| Registro 1 de 3 | |
| Autor: | Gilson, Stuart-C - |
| Título: | Transactions Costs and Capital Structure Choice: Evidence from Financially Distressed Firms |
| Fuente: | Journal of Finance. v.52, n.1. American Finance Association |
| Páginas: | pp. 161-96 |
| Año: | Mar. 1997 |
| Resumen: | This study provides evidence that transaction costs discourage debt reductions by financially distressed firms when they restructure their debt out of court. As a result, these firms remain highly leveraged and one-in-three subsequently experience financial distress. Transactions costs are significantly smaller, hence leverage falls by more and there is less recurrence of financial distress when firms recontract in Chapter 11. Chapter 11 therefore gives financially distressed firms more flexibility to choose optimal capital structures. |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA J + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 2 de 3 | |
| Autor: | DeAngelo, Harry - DeAngelo, Linda - Gilson, Stuart-C - |
| Título: | Perceptions and the Politics of Finance: Junk Bonds and the Regulatory Seizure of First Capital Life |
| Fuente: | Journal of Financial Economics. v.41, n.3. Elsevier Science |
| Páginas: | pp. 475-511 |
| Año: | July 1996 |
| Resumen: | In May 1991, one month after seizing Executive Life, California regulators seized First Capital Life (FCLIC). Both insurers were Drexel clients with large junk bond holdings, and both had experienced ’bank runs.’ FCLIC’s run followed regulators’ televised comments that its poor condition necessitated a substantial cash infusion. Yet FCLIC’s statutory capital--with junk bonds, real estate, and mortgages marked to market--was far from lowest among major insurers with California policyholders. It becomes lowest if junk bonds ’alone’ are marked to market at year-end 1990 (ignoring larger market declines in real estate/mortgages and the junk bond market’s 21return in early 1991). Our findings suggest a regulatory bias against junk bonds in the political backlash against the 1980s. |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA J + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 3 de 3 | |
| Autor: | DeAngelo, Harry - DeAngelo, Linda - Gilson, Stuart-C - |
| Título: | The Collapse of First Executive Corporation Junk Bonds, Adverse Publicity, and the ’Run on the Bank’ Phenomenon |
| Fuente: | Journal of Financial Economics. v.36, n.3. Elsevier Science |
| Páginas: | pp. 287-336 |
| Año: | Dec. 1994 |
| Resumen: | In April 1991, regulators seized the major subsidiaries of First Executive Corporation, an insurer that invested heavily in junk bonds. During the junk bond market turmoil of 1989-90, adverse publicity fueled a bank run at First Executive Corporation, forcing a $4 billion portfolio liquidation before the market rose 50-60 percent in 1991-92. More traditional insurers did not receive commensurate press coverage, despite their substantial exposure to real estate declines, which were roughly 2.5 times the junk bond decline. Seizure of First Executive Corporation’s subsidiaries was defensible, although First Executive Corporation would have become solvent within a year, given average junk bond market appreciation. |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA J + datos de Fuente |
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