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Recursos bibliográficos en papel y digitales -
- libros, artículos de revistas,
ponencias de eventos, etc. -
» Resultado:
9 registros
| Registro 1 de 9 |
| Autor: |
Holmstrom, Bengt - Roberts, John - |
| Título: |
The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited |
| Fuente: |
Journal of Economic Perspectives. v.12, n.4. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: |
pp. 73-94 |
| Año: |
fall 1998 |
| Resumen: |
Both transaction cost-economics and property-rights theories offer explanations of the boundaries of the firm based on ideas of ex post bargaining and holdup. These theories are quite distinct in their empirical predictions, but neither offers a satisfactory account of a large variety of observed practices. The authors discuss a number of such examples, where the boundaries of the firm seem to be determined by factors other than the need to protect investments, and where other mechanisms than the allocation of asset ownership are used to provide investment incentives. These examples indicate the need to enrich their theory of firm boundaries. |
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA J + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 2 de 9 |
| Autor: |
Holmstrom, Bengt - Tirole, Jean - |
| Título: |
Modeling Aggregate Liquidity |
| Fuente: |
American Economic Review. v.86, n.2. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: |
pp. 187-91 |
| Año: |
May 1996 |
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 3 de 9 |
| Autor: |
Baker, George - Holmstrom, Bengt - |
| Título: |
Internal Labor Markets: Too Many Theories, Too Few Facts |
| Fuente: |
American Economic Review. v.85, n.2. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: |
pp. 255-59 |
| Año: |
May 1995 |
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 4 de 9 |
| Autor: |
Holmstrom, Bengt - Milgrom, Paul - |
| Título: |
The Firm as an Incentive System |
| Fuente: |
American Economic Review. v.84, n.4. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: |
pp. 972-91 |
| Año: |
Sept. 1994 |
| Resumen: |
The authors explore the twin hypotheses (1) that high-performance incentives, worker ownership of assets, and worker freedom from direct controls are complementary instruments for motivating workers, and (2) that such instruments can be expected to covary positively in cross-sectional data. They also relate their conclusions to empirical evidence, particularly that on the organization, compensation, and management of sales forces. |
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
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