MegaCatálogo Bibliográfico
Centro de Documentación. FCEyS. UNMdP

- Recursos bibliográficos en papel y digitales -
- libros, artículos de revistas, ponencias de eventos, etc. -

» Resultado: 3 registros

Registro 1 de 3
Autor: Bulow, Jeremy - Klemperer, Paul - 
Título: Auctions versus Negotiations
Fuente: American Economic Review. v.86, n.1. American Economic Association
Páginas: pp. 180-94
Año: Mar. 1996
Resumen: Which is the more profitable way to sell a company: an auction with no reserve price or an optimally structured negotiation with one less bidder? The authors show, under reasonable assumptions, that the auction is always preferable when bidders’ signals are independent. For affiliated signals, the result holds under certain restrictions on the seller’s choice of negotiating mechanism. The result suggests that the value of negotiating skill is small relative to the value of additional competition. The paper also shows how the analogies between monopoly theory and auction theory can help derive new results in auction theory.
Solicitar por: HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente
Registro 2 de 3
Autor: Klemperer, Paul - 
Título: Equilibrium Product Lines: Competing Head-to-Head May Be Less Competitive
Fuente: American Economic Review. v.82, n.4. American Economic Association
Páginas: pp. 740-55
Año: Sept. 1992
Resumen: The author suggests a new model of demand for variety that explains why competing firms may choose very similar product lines: if firms offer different product ranges, some consumers use multiple suppliers to increase variety and, since these consumers’ purchases will be sensitive to the difference in firms’ prices, the market may be fairly competitive. If, instead, firms offer identical product ranges, each consumer purchases from one firm only because of costs of using additional suppliers, so the market may be less competitive and equilibrium prices higher. This contrasts with the standard intuition that firms minimize competition by differentiating their products.
Solicitar por: HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente
Registro 3 de 3
Autor: Froot, Kenneth-A - Klemperer, Paul-D
Título: Exchange Rate Pass-Through When Market Share Matters
Fuente: American Economic Review. v.79, n.4. American Economic Association
Páginas: pp. 637-54
Año: Sept. 1989
Resumen: The authors investigate the pass-through from exchange rates to import prices when firms’ future demands depend on their current market shares. They show that profit-maximizing foreign firms may either raise or lower their dollar export prices when the dollar appreciates temporarily (i.e., the pass-through may be perverse) and that current import prices may be more sensitive to expected future exchange rates than to current exchange rates. They present evidence that suggests the behavior of expected future exchange rates may provide a clue to the puzzling recent behavior of U.S. import prices.
Solicitar por: HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente

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