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Recursos bibliográficos en papel y digitales -
- libros, artículos de revistas,
ponencias de eventos, etc. -
» Resultado: 4 registros
| Registro 1 de 4 | |
| Autor: | Holderness, Clifford-G - Kroszner, Randall-S - Sheehan, Dennis-P |
| Título: | Were the Good Old Days That Good? Changes in Managerial Stock Ownership since the Great Depression |
| Fuente: | Journal of Finance. v.54, n.2. American Finance Association |
| Páginas: | pp. 435-69 |
| Año: | Apr. 1999 |
| Resumen: | The authors document that ownership by officers and directors of publicly traded firms is on average higher today than earlier in the century. Managerial ownership has risen from 13 percent for the universe of exchange-listed corporations in 1935, the earliest year for which such data exist, to 21 percent in 1995. The authors examine, in detail, the robustness of the increase and explore hypotheses to explain it. Higher managerial ownership has not substituted for alternative corporate governance mechanisms. Lower volatility and greater hedging opportunities associated with the development of financial markets appear to be important factors explaining the increase in managerial ownership. |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA J + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 2 de 4 | |
| Autor: | Kroszner, Randall-S - Stratmann, Thomas |
| Título: | Interest-Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services’ Political Action Committees |
| Fuente: | American Economic Review. v.88, n.5. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: | pp. 1163-87 |
| Año: | Dec. 1998 |
| Resumen: | The authors develop a positive theory of how interest-group competition shapes the organization of Congress and use it to explain campaign contribution patterns in financial services. Since interest groups cannot enforce fee-for-service contracts with legislators, legislators have an incentive to create specialized, standing committees which foster repeated dealing between interests and committee members. The resulting reputational equilibrium supports high contributions and high legislative effort for the interests. Contribution patterns by competing interests in the congressional battle over whether banks can enter new businesses support the theory, which also has implications for term limits and campaign reform. |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 3 de 4 | |
| Autor: | Kroszner, Randall-S - Strahan, Philip-E |
| Título: | Regulatory Incentives and the Thrift Crisis: Dividends, Mutual-to-Stock Conversions, and Financial Distress |
| Fuente: | Journal of Finance. v.51, n.4. American Finance Association |
| Páginas: | pp. 1285-1319 |
| Año: | Sept. 1996 |
| Resumen: | During the 1980s, insolvency of individual thrifts and the thrift deposit insurer created severe incentive problems. Lacking cash to close insolvent thrifts, regulators induced nearly $10 billion of private capital to flow into the industry through mutual-to-stock conversions. The authors test a theory of how regulators encouraged capital-impaired mutual thrifts to convert by permitting them to pay dividends rather than rebuild capital. They estimate the costs of this policy and interpret the 1991 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act as requiring regulators to impose restraints on depository institutions parallel to debt covenants that prevent capital distributions by nonfinancial firms experiencing distress. |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA J + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 4 de 4 | |
| Autor: | Kroszner, Randall-S - Rajan, Raghuram-G - |
| Título: | Is the Glass-Steagall Act Justified? A Study of the U.S. Experience with Universal Banking before 1933 |
| Fuente: | American Economic Review. v.84, n.4. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: | pp. 810-32 |
| Año: | Sept. 1994 |
| Resumen: | The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 removed commercial banks from the securities underwriting business. The authors evaluate the argument for the separation of commercial and investment banking that conflicts of interest induce commercial banks to fool the public into investing in securities which turn out to be of low quality. A comparison of the performance of securities underwritten by commercial and investment banks prior to the act shows no evidence of this. Instead, the public appears to have rationally accounted for the possibility of conflicts of interest and this appears to have constrained the banks to underwrite high-quality securities. |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
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