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Recursos bibliográficos en papel y digitales -
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» Resultado: 2 registros
| Registro 1 de 2 | |
| Autor: | Athey, Susan - Levin, Jonathan - |
| Título: | Information and competition in U.S. forest service timber auctions |
| Fuente: | Journal of Political Economy. v.109, n.2. The University of Chicago Press |
| Páginas: | pp. 375-417 |
| Año: | Apr. 2001 |
| Resumen: | This paper analyzes the role of private information in U.S. Forest Service timber auctions. In these auctions, firms bid a per unit price for each timber species. Total bids are computed by multiplying these prices by Forest Service volume estimates, but payments depend on actual volumes harvested. We develop an equilibrium theory for these auctions. We then relate (ex post) data about volume to (ex ante) bids. We show that bidders have private information about volumes of species and use it as predicted by theory. Differences in bidder estimates appear to affect the allocation of tracts, but competition limits information rentsr |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA J + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 2 de 2 | |
| Autor: | Levin, Jonathan - Nalebuff, Barry - |
| Título: | An Introduction to Vote-Counting Schemes |
| Fuente: | Journal of Economic Perspectives. v.9, n.1. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: | pp. 3-26 |
| Año: | winter 1995 |
| Resumen: | Many researchers, following Kenneth Arrow’s lead, have concerned themselves with stating various desirable or undesirable criteria and attempting to classify vote-counting systems. This paper moves away from theoretical discussions: the authors illustrate and motivate a variety of alternatives to plurality rule. The authors demonstrate by example how these alternatives, such as min-max majority and single transferable vote, work and where they fail. In choosing between flawed alternatives, which methods are best suited for selecting a single winner versus ranking the candidates? Does one approach favor candidates with loyal minorities or candidates with broad appeal? How do the authors achieve a representative outcome? |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA J + datos de Fuente |
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