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» Resultado: 2 registros
| Registro 1 de 2 | |
| Autor: | La-Porta, Rafael - Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio - Shleifer, Andrei - |
| Título: | Corporate Ownership around the World |
| Fuente: | Journal of Finance. v.54, n.2. American Finance Association |
| Páginas: | pp. 471-517 |
| Año: | Apr. 1999 |
| Resumen: | The authors use data on ownership structures of large corporations in twenty-seven wealthy economies to identify the ultimate controlling shareholders of these firms. They find that, except in economies with very good shareholder protection, relatively few of these firms are widely held, in contrast to Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means’s (1932) image of ownership of the modern corporation. Rather, these firms are typically controlled by families or the state. Equity control by financial institutions is far less common. The controlling shareholders typically have power over firms significantly in excess of their cash flow rights, primarily through the use of pyramids and participation in management. |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA J + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 2 de 2 | |
| Autor: | Blanchard, Olivier-Jean - Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio - Shleifer, Andrei - |
| Título: | What Do Firms Do with Cash Windfalls? |
| Fuente: | Journal of Financial Economics. v.36, n.3. Elsevier Science |
| Páginas: | pp. 337-60 |
| Año: | Dec. 1994 |
| Resumen: | Suppose that a firm receives a cash windfall which does not change its investment opportunity set or, equivalently, its marginal Tobin’s ’Q’. What will this firm do with the money? We provide empirical answers to this question using a sample of eleven firms with such windfalls in the form of a won or settled lawsuit. We examine a variety of decisions of the firm to shed light on alternative theories of corporate financing and investment. Our evidence is broadly inconsistent with the perfect capital markets model. The results need to be stretched considerably to fit the asymmetric information model in which managers act in the interest of shareholders. The evidence supports the agency model of managerial behavior, in which managers try to ensure the long-run survival and independence of the firms with themselves at the helm. |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA J + datos de Fuente |
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