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Recursos bibliográficos en papel y digitales -
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» Resultado: 2 registros
| Registro 1 de 2 | |
| Autor: | Ma, Ching-to-Albert - McGuire, Thomas-G - |
| Título: | Optimal Health Insurance and Provider Payment |
| Fuente: | American Economic Review. v.87, n.4. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: | pp. 685-704 |
| Año: | Sept. 1997 |
| Resumen: | The authors derive optimal insurance for patients and payment method for physicians when neither the input decided by the patient (quantity of treatment) nor the input decided by the physician (effort) are contractible. The equilibrium in this third-best regime may sometimes be second best, in which both the physician input and the report of treatment are verifiable. Otherwise, truthful reporting forces a third best, characterized by provider ’prospective payment’ and suboptimal effort, while consumers’ demand becomes excessive. The authors also analyze how ’professional ethics’ alters the equilibrium. Finally, collusive reporting mechanisms imply more stringent constraints, while competition among physicians relaxes them. |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 2 de 2 | |
| Autor: | Biglaiser, Gary - Ma, Ching-to-Albert - |
| Título: | Regulating a Dominant Firm: Unknown Demand and Industry Structure |
| Fuente: | RAND Journal of Economics. v.26, n.1. RAND |
| Páginas: | pp. 1-19 |
| Año: | spring 1995 |
| Resumen: | In this article, the authors study the optimal regulation of a dominant firm when an unregulated firm actively competes. Generally, the existence of an active rival imposes new and binding constraints on regulatory problems. The authors characterize optimal policies both when demands are known (complete information) and unknown (incomplete information) to the regulator. Optimal policies under complete information may set the price at the dominant firm above or below its marginal cost. Optimal policies under incomplete information may be either pooling or separating, constant over a range of the prior distribution of the firm’s private information, and leave no information rent to the firm. |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA R + datos de Fuente |
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