-
Recursos bibliográficos en papel y digitales -
- libros, artículos de revistas,
ponencias de eventos, etc. -
» Resultado: 3 registros
| Registro 1 de 3 | |
| Autor: | Grossman, Gene-M - Maggi, Giovanni - |
| Título: | Diversity and Trade |
| Fuente: | American Economic Review. v.90, n.5. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: | pp. 1255-75 |
| Año: | Dec. 2000 |
| Resumen: | We develop a competitive model of trade between countries with similar aggregate factor endowments. The trade pattern reflects differences in the distribution of talent across the labor forces of the two countries. The country with a relatively homogeneous population exports the good produced by a technology with complementarities between tasks. The country with a more diverse workforce exports the good for which individual success is more important. Imperfect observability of talent strengthens the forces of comparative advantage. Finally, we examine the effects of trade on income distribution and the composition of firms in each industry. |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 2 de 3 | |
| Autor: | Maggi, Giovanni - |
| Título: | Strategic Trade Policies with Endogenous Mode of Competition |
| Fuente: | American Economic Review. v.86, n.1. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: | pp. 237-58 |
| Año: | Mar. 1996 |
| Resumen: | This paper develops a model of capacity-price competition in which the equilibrium outcome ranges from the Bertrand to the Cournot outcome as capacity constraints become more important. This model is employed to reexamine aspects of strategic-trade-policy theory and, in particular, the theory’s well-known sensitivity to the mode of oligopolistic competition. Among other things, the analysis identifies a simple single-rate policy, namely, capacity subsidies, which can increase the home country’s income regardless of the mode of competition. This suggests that the presence of critical informational constraints need not diminish governments’ incentives to distort the international competition. |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 3 de 3 | |
| Autor: | Maggi, Giovanni - Rodriguez-Clare, Andres - |
| Título: | Costly Distortion of Information in Agency Problems |
| Fuente: | RAND Journal of Economics. v.26, n.4. RAND |
| Páginas: | pp. 675-89 |
| Año: | winter 1995 |
| Resumen: | Anecdotal evidence suggests that agents often spend resources distorting information transmitted to principals. We present a model where costly information distortion emerges as equilibrium behavior. The information structure we focus on is intermediate between (and encompasses) the cases of private information and public information: the agent can falsify the privately observed state at some cost. Although the principal can design contracts that induce no falsification, these may involve excessive information rents: falsification can be beneficial in spite of the waste of resources involved, because it helps reduce information rents. We examine how optimal contract and equilibrium payoffs change as the information structure ranges from private to public information. |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA R + datos de Fuente |
*** No hay más registros para visualizar ***
>> Nueva búsqueda <<