-
Recursos bibliográficos en papel y digitales -
- libros, artículos de revistas,
ponencias de eventos, etc. -
» Resultado: 3 registros
| Registro 1 de 3 | |
| Autor: | Currie, Janet - McConnell, Sheena - |
| Título: | Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector: Reply |
| Fuente: | American Economic Review. v.86, n.1. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: | pp. 327-28 |
| Año: | Mar. 1996 |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 2 de 3 | |
| Autor: | Currie, Janet - McConnell, Sheena - |
| Título: | Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector: The Effect of Legal Structure on Dispute Costs and Wages |
| Fuente: | American Economic Review. v.81, n.4. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: | pp. 693-718 |
| Año: | Sept. 1991 |
| Resumen: | This paper examines the impact of collective-bargaining legislation on dispute costs and wages using a panel of Canadian public-sector contracts. The authors’ results suggest that policymakers designing collective-bargaining legislation face a trade-off between reducing dispute costs and increasing wages. Dispute costs are lower under compulsory arbitration than under the right to strike or when no collective-bargaining legislation exists. Hence, a switch to compulsory arbitration could potentially make both the union and the employer better off by reducing dispute costs. However, the authors find that wages are higher under compulsory arbitration than under other legal structures. |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 3 de 3 | |
| Autor: | McConnell, Sheena - |
| Título: | Strikes, Wages, and Private Information |
| Fuente: | American Economic Review. v.79, n.4. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: | pp. 801-15 |
| Año: | Sept. 1989 |
| Resumen: | Private information models of strikes suggest that the strike is used as an information revealing device by the union in the presence of asymmetrical information. A testable prediction of these models is that there is a negative relationship between strikes and the unpredicted component of the wage. This paper finds evidence of such a relationship in a large sample of U.S. labor contracts. The real wage falls by about 3 percent after a strike lasting one hundred days. |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
*** No hay más registros para visualizar ***
>> Nueva búsqueda <<