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Recursos bibliográficos en papel y digitales -
- libros, artículos de revistas,
ponencias de eventos, etc. -
» Resultado: 4 registros
| Registro 1 de 4 | |
| Autor: | Banerjee, Abhijit - Mookherjee, Dilip - Munshi, Kaivan - Ray, Debraj |
| Título: | Inequality, control rights, and rent seeking : sugar cooperatives in maharashtra |
| Fuente: | Journal of Political Economy. v.109, n.1. The University of Chicago Press |
| Páginas: | pp. 138-191 |
| Año: | Feb. 2001 |
| Resumen: | This paper presents a theory of rent seeking within farmer cooperatives in which inequality of asset ownership affects relative control rights of different groups of members. The two key assumptions are constraints on lump-sum transfers from poorer members and disproportionate control rights wielded by wealthier members. Transfers of rents to the latter are achieved by depressing prices paid for inputs supplied by members and diverting resulting retained earnings. The theory predicts that increased heterogeneity of landholdings in the local area causes increased inefficiency by inducing a lower input price and a lower level of installed crushing capacity. Predictions concerning the effect of the distribution of local landownership on sugarcane price, capacity levels, and participation rates of different classes of farmers are confirmed by data from nearly 100 sugar cooperatives in the Indian state of Maharashtra over the period 1971-93 |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA J + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 2 de 4 | |
| Autor: | Bardhan, Pranab-K - Mookherjee, Dilip - |
| Título: | Capture and Governance at Local and National Levels |
| Fuente: | American Economic Review. v.90, n.2. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: | pp. 135-39 |
| Año: | May 2000 |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 3 de 4 | |
| Autor: | Melumad, Nahum-D - Mookherjee, Dilip - Reichelstein, Stefan - |
| Título: | Hierarchical Decentralization of Incentive Contracts |
| Fuente: | RAND Journal of Economics. v.26, n.4. RAND |
| Páginas: | pp. 654-72 |
| Año: | winter 1995 |
| Resumen: | Agents in a hierarchy are commonly delegated authority to communicate and contract with agents at lower levels. While delegation reduces the burden of communication and information processing on the principal, it also introduces additional incentive problems. The authors find that, with sufficient monitoring of the agents’ contributions to joint production and a particular sequence of contracting, the addition incentive problems inherent in delegation can be completely resolved. These conditions are generally also necessary for delegation to achieve second-best results. |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA R + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 4 de 4 | |
| Autor: | Mookherjee, Dilip - Png, I-P-L - |
| Título: | Monitoring vis-a-vis Investigation in Enforcement of Law |
| Fuente: | American Economic Review. v.82, n.3. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: | pp. 556-65 |
| Año: | June 1992 |
| Resumen: | Enforcement by monitoring cannot be conditioned on the severity of an offense while enforcement by investigation can be. If some degrees of the offenses are not adequately reported or if investigation is too costly, the regulator must monitor and treat offenses of different severity quite differently. Smaller offenses should not be investigated; they should be deterred by monitoring alone, coupled with graduated fines. To deter larger offenses, the regulator should vary the investigation rate while setting maximal fines. |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
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