MegaCatálogo Bibliográfico
Centro de Documentación. FCEyS. UNMdP

- Recursos bibliográficos en papel y digitales -
- libros, artículos de revistas, ponencias de eventos, etc. -

» Resultado: 2 registros

Registro 1 de 2
Autor: Perotti, Enrico-C - 
Título: Credible Privatization
Fuente: American Economic Review. v.85, n.4. American Economic Association
Páginas: pp. 847-59
Año: Sept. 1995
Resumen: Privatization shifts residual income and control to private investors, restricting redistribution and improving incentives; thus rapid privatization should be desirable. Empirically, however, the transfer of ownership, as opposed to control, is very gradual. The author offers an explanation based on investors’ concerns about future interference. A government averse to redistribution retains a passive stake in the firm; the willingness to bear residual risk signals commitment. When a large government stake conflicts with the transfer of control, underpricing may be necessary for separation. Finally, when the required discount is large, a committed government may prefer not to signal, gaining credibility over time.
Solicitar por: HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente
Registro 2 de 2
Autor: Perotti, Enrico-C - Spier, Kathryn-E - 
Título: Capital Structure as a Bargaining Tool: The Role of Leverage in Contract Renegotiation
Fuente: American Economic Review. v.83, n.5. American Economic Association
Páginas: pp. 1131-41
Año: Dec. 1993
Resumen: This paper presents a strategic model of temporarily high leverage. When the repayment of senior claims depends in part upon further investment, shareholders may be able to alter credibly their incentives to invest through an exchange of junior debt for equity and thereby force concessions from senior creditors. The authors focus on the conflict between shareholders and risk-averse workers and show that this strategic use of debt leads to an inefficient allocation of risk. They characterize conditions under which firms will undergo leveraged recapitalizations, their choice of debt instruments, and the dynamics of their capital structure.
Solicitar por: HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente

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