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Recursos bibliográficos en papel y digitales -
- libros, artículos de revistas,
ponencias de eventos, etc. -
» Resultado: 4 registros
| Registro 1 de 4 | |
| Autor: | Persson, Torsten - Roland, Gérard - Tabellini, Guido - |
| Título: | Comparative politics and public finance |
| Fuente: | Journal of Political Economy. v.108, n.6. The University of Chicago Press |
| Páginas: | pp. 1121-1161 |
| Año: | Dec. 2000 |
| Resumen: | We propose a model with micropolitical foundations to contrast different political regimes. Compared to a parliamentary regime, the institutions of a presidential-congressional regime produce fewer incentives for legislative cohesion but more separation of powers. These differences are reflected in the size and composition of government spending. A parliamentary regime has redistribution toward a majority, less underprovision of public goods, and more rents to politicians; a presidential-congressional regime has redistribution toward powerful minorities, more underprovision of public goods, but less rents to politicians. The size of government is smaller under a presidential regime. This last prediction is consistent with cross-country data |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA J + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 2 de 4 | |
| Autor: | Persson, Torsten - Tabellini, Guido - |
| Título: | Monetary Cohabitation in Europe |
| Fuente: | American Economic Review. v.86, n.2. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: | pp. 111-16 |
| Año: | May 1996 |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 3 de 4 | |
| Autor: | Persson, Torsten - Tabellini, Guido - |
| Título: | Is Inequality Harmful for Growth? |
| Fuente: | American Economic Review. v.84, n.3. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: | pp. 600-621 |
| Año: | June 1994 |
| Resumen: | Is inequality harmful for growth? The authors suggest that it is. In a society where distributional conflict is important, political decisions produce economic policies that tax investment and growth-promoting activities in order to redistribute income. The paper formulates a theoretical model that captures this idea. The model’s implications are supported by the evidence. Both historical panel data and postwar cross-sections indicate a significant and large negative relation between inequality and growth. This relation is only present in democracies. |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 4 de 4 | |
| Autor: | Kotlikoff, Laurence-J - Persson, Torsten - Svensson, Lars-E-O - |
| Título: | Social Contracts as Assets: A Possible Solution to the Time-Consistency Problem |
| Fuente: | American Economic Review. v.78, n.4. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: | pp. 662-77 |
| Año: | Sept. 1988 |
| Resumen: | The authors present a new solution to the time-consistency problem that appears capable of enforcing ex ante policy i n settings where other enforcement mechanisms do not work. The soluti on involves a social contract that specifies the optimal ex ante poli cy and is effectively sold by successive old generations to successiv e young generations, who pay for the social contract through intergen erational transfers. Both old and young generations have an economic incentive to fulfill the social contract. The authors apply the solut ion to show how an equilibrium without excessive capital taxation can be enforced, despite an ongoing temptation to impose ex post capital levies. |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
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