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Recursos bibliográficos en papel y digitales -
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» Resultado: 2 registros
| Registro 1 de 2 | |
| Autor: | Png, I-P-L - Reitman, David - |
| Título: | Service Time Competition |
| Fuente: | RAND Journal of Economics. v.25, n.4. RAND |
| Páginas: | pp. 619-34 |
| Año: | winter 1994 |
| Resumen: | How can two physically identical gasoline stations differentiate themselves? In this article, the authors develop and test a model of service time competition: some stations set higher prices and thereby offer shorter queues, whereas others offer lower price and longer queues. The authors find that retail demand is sensitive to service time: customers are, on average, willing to pay about 1 percent more for a 6 percent reduction in congestion. Consistent with the service time hypothesis, prices are more dispersed at stations facing more direct competition. |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA R + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 2 de 2 | |
| Autor: | Mookherjee, Dilip - Png, I-P-L - |
| Título: | Monitoring vis-a-vis Investigation in Enforcement of Law |
| Fuente: | American Economic Review. v.82, n.3. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: | pp. 556-65 |
| Año: | June 1992 |
| Resumen: | Enforcement by monitoring cannot be conditioned on the severity of an offense while enforcement by investigation can be. If some degrees of the offenses are not adequately reported or if investigation is too costly, the regulator must monitor and treat offenses of different severity quite differently. Smaller offenses should not be investigated; they should be deterred by monitoring alone, coupled with graduated fines. To deter larger offenses, the regulator should vary the investigation rate while setting maximal fines. |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
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