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Recursos bibliográficos en papel y digitales -
- libros, artículos de revistas,
ponencias de eventos, etc. -
» Resultado:
82 registros
| Registro 1 de 82 |
| Autor: |
Shreedhar, Ganga - Tavoni, Alessandro - Marchiori, Carmen |
| Título: |
Monitoring and punishment networks in an experimental common pool resource dilemma |
| Fuente: |
Environment and Development Economics. v.25, n.1. Beijer Institute of Ecological Economics; Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences |
| Páginas: |
pp. 66-94 |
| Año: |
feb. 2020 |
| Resumen: |
With the aid of a lab experiment, we explored how imperfect monitoring and punishment networks impacted appropriation, punishment and beliefs in a common pool resource appropriation dilemma. We studied the differences between the complete network (with perfect monitoring and punishment, in which everyone can observe and punish everyone else) and two ’imperfect’ networks (that systematically reduce the number of subjects who could monitor and punish others): the directed and undirected circle networks. We found that free riders were punished in all treatments, but the network topology impacted the type of punishment: the undirected circle induced more severe punishment and prosocial punishment compared to the other two networks. Both imperfect networks were more efficient because the larger punishment capacity available in the complete network elicited higher punishment amount. |
| Palabras clave: |
RECURSOS COMUNES | SUPERVISION |
REDES |
|
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA E + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 2 de 82 |
| Autor: |
Joshi, Kuhu |
| Título: |
The impact of drought on human capital in rural India |
| Fuente: |
Environment and Development Economics. v.24, n.4. Beijer Institute of Ecological Economics; Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences |
| Páginas: |
pp. 413-436 |
| Año: |
aug. 2019 |
| Resumen: |
We study the impact of a severe drought on children’s educational outcomes in rural Maharashtra, a state in central India. Using pooled cross section data on children’s test scores, we employ a difference-in-differences methodology to estimate the impact. We find that the drought caused a decline of 4.14 per cent in math scores and 2.67 per cent in reading scores of affected children. We also study heterogeneity in the impact by gender, age, parents’ schooling, and household wealth, finding evidence in support of an income effect whereby households with limited means to smooth consumption disinvest in their children in response to the drought. |
| Palabras clave: |
CAPITAL HUMANO |
SEQUIA |
CAMBIO CLIMATICO |
EDUCACION |
NINOS |
|
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA E + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 3 de 82 |
| Autor: |
Gatiso, Tsegaye T. - Vollan, Björn |
| Título: |
Democracy and cooperation in commons management: experimental evidence of representative and direct democracy from community forests in Ethiopia |
| Fuente: |
Environment and Development Economics. v.22, n.2. Beijer Institute of Ecological Economics; Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences |
| Páginas: |
pp. 110-132 |
| Año: |
apr. 2017 |
| Resumen: |
The authors use dynamic lab-in-the-field common pool resource experiments to investigate the role of two forms of democracy on the cooperation of forest users in Ethiopia. In this experimental setup, participants can either directly select a rule (direct democracy) or elect a leader who decides on the introduction of rules (representative democracy). These two treatments are compared with the imposition of rules and imposition of leaders. It is found that both endogenous leaders elected by the community members and endogenous rules selected by the direct involvement of the participants are more effective in promoting cooperation among the community members compared to exogenous leadership, exogenous rule imposition and the baseline scenario without any of these modifications. However, no significant difference is found between representative democracy in the election of leadership and direct democracy in the selection of rules. Leadership characteristics and behavior are further analyzed. The results underline the importance of democratic procedures. |
| Palabras clave: |
DEMOCRACIA |
BIENES PUBLICOS |
LIDERAZGO |
COMPORTAMIENTO |
|
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA E + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 4 de 82 |
| Autor: |
Ou, Jiun-Nan |
| Título: |
Swimming pool versus art museum: Efficiency in the provision of local public facilities with heterogeneity |
| Fuente: |
Journal of Applied Economics. v.19, n.2. Universidad del CEMA |
| Páginas: |
pp. 383-400 |
| Año: |
Nov. 2016 |
| Resumen: |
This paper follows an approach adopted by Cremer, Marchand and Pestieau (1997) to analyze efficiency in the provision of heterogeneous local public facilities. Even when spillovers exist, under certain conditions the local government could still reach the optimum provision of the local public good, otherwise there is under-provision. Secondly, relaxing the non-excludability assumption, provision efficiency could be achieved if the local governments collect the service fees based on the neighboring community user’s net marginal willingness to pay. If not, the service fee mechanism would not always be able to eliminate the preexisting allocation inefficiency and could sometimes lead to increased inefficiency due to overprovision of the public good. |
| Palabras clave: |
BIENES PUBLICOS |
GOBIERNO LOCAL |
|
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA J + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 5 de 82 |
| Autor: |
Becchetti, Leonardo - Castriota, Stefano - Conzo, Pierluigi |
| Título: |
Social capital dynamics and collective action: the role of subjective satisfaction in a common pool resource experiment |
| Fuente: |
Environment and Development Economics. v.21, n.4. Beijer Institute of Ecological Economics; Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences |
| Páginas: |
pp. 512-531 |
| Año: |
Aug. 2016 |
| Resumen: |
In low-income countries, grassroots collective action for the management of a common environmental resource is a well-known substitute for government provision of public goods. In our research we test experimentally what its effect is on social capital. To this purpose we structure a ’sandwich’ experiment in which participants play a common pool resource game (CPRG) between two trust games in a Nairobi slum where social capital is scarce but informal rules regulating the commons are abundant. Our findings show that the change in trustworthiness between the two trust game rounds generated by the CPRG experience is crucially affected by the subjective satisfaction about the CPRG, rather than by standard objective measures related to CPRG players’ behaviour. These results highlight that subjective satisfaction in a collective action has relevant predictive power on social capital creation, providing information which can be crucial to designing successful self-organized environmental resource regimes. |
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA E + datos de Fuente |
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