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Recursos bibliográficos en papel y digitales -
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» Resultado: 4 registros
| Registro 1 de 4 | |
| Autor: | Rabin, Matthew - |
| Título: | Psychology and Economics |
| Fuente: | Journal of Economic Literature. v.36, n.1. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: | pp. 11-46 |
| Año: | Mar. 1998 |
| Resumen: | Because psychology systematically explores human judgment, behavior, and well-being, it can teach us important lessons about how humans differ from the way they are traditionally described by economists. This essay discusses a selection of psychological findings relevant to economics. While standard economics assumes that each person maximizes stable and coherent preferences given rationally-formed probabilistic beliefs, psychological research teaches us about ways to describe preferences more realistically, about biases in belief-formation, and about ways it is misleading to conceptualize people as attempting to maximize stable, coherent, and accurately perceived preferences. |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA J + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 2 de 4 | |
| Autor: | Rabin, Matthew (Reviewer) |
| Título: | Review of: The rational foundations of economic behaviour: Proceedings of the IEA Conference held in Turin, Italy |
| Fuente: | Journal of Economic Literature. v.35, n.4. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: | pp. 2045-2046 |
| Año: | Dec. 1997 |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA J + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 3 de 4 | |
| Autor: | Farrell, Joseph - Rabin, Matthew - |
| Título: | Cheap Talk |
| Fuente: | Journal of Economic Perspectives. v.10, n.3. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: | pp. 103-18 |
| Año: | summer 1996 |
| Resumen: | Economists often ask how private information is shared through markets, costly signaling, and other mechanisms. Yet most information sharing is done through ordinary, informal talk. Economists are inconsistent in their view of such ’cheap talk’: sometimes it is supposed that communication generally leads to efficient equilibria; other times it is supposed that since ’talk is cheap,’ it is never credible. The authors think both views are wrong. In this paper, they describe what some recent research in game theory teaches about when people will convey private information by cheap talk. |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA J + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 4 de 4 | |
| Autor: | Rabin, Matthew - |
| Título: | Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics |
| Fuente: | American Economic Review. v.83, n.5. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: | pp. 1281-1302 |
| Año: | Dec. 1993 |
| Resumen: | People like to help those who are helping them and to hurt those who are hurting them. Outcomes rejecting such motivations are called fairness equilibria. Outcomes are mutual-max when each person maximizes the other’s material payoffs, and mutual-min when each person minimizes the other’s payoffs. It is shown that every mutual-max or mutual-min Nash equilibrium is a fairness equilibrium. If payoffs are small, fairness equilibria are roughly the set of mutual-max and mutual-min outcomes; if payoffs are large, fairness equilibria are roughly the set of Nash equilibria. Several economic examples are considered and possible welfare implications of fairness are explored. |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
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