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Recursos bibliográficos en papel y digitales - - libros, artículos de revistas,
ponencias de eventos, etc. -
» Resultado:
2 registros
Registro 1 de 2 |
Autor: |
Edlin, Aaron-S - Reichelstein, Stefan - |
Título: |
Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment |
Fuente: |
American Economic Review. v.86, n.3. American Economic Association |
Páginas: |
pp. 478-501 |
Año: |
June 1996 |
Resumen: |
In bilateral trading problems, the parties may be hesitant to make relationship-specific investments without adequate contractual protection. The authors postulate that the parties can sign noncontingent contracts prior to investing and can freely renegotiate them after information about the desirability of trade is revealed. They find that such contracts can induce one party to invest efficiently when courts impose either a breach remedy of specific performance or expectation damages. Moreover, specific performance can induce both parties to invest efficiently if a separability condition holds. Expectation damages, on the other hand, is poorly suited to solve bilateral investment problems. |
Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
Registro 2 de 2 |
Autor: |
Melumad, Nahum-D - Mookherjee, Dilip - Reichelstein, Stefan - |
Título: |
Hierarchical Decentralization of Incentive Contracts |
Fuente: |
RAND Journal of Economics. v.26, n.4. RAND |
Páginas: |
pp. 654-72 |
Año: |
winter 1995 |
Resumen: |
Agents in a hierarchy are commonly delegated authority to communicate and contract with agents at lower levels. While delegation reduces the burden of communication and information processing on the principal, it also introduces additional incentive problems. The authors find that, with sufficient monitoring of the agents’ contributions to joint production and a particular sequence of contracting, the addition incentive problems inherent in delegation can be completely resolved. These conditions are generally also necessary for delegation to achieve second-best results. |
Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA R + datos de Fuente |
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