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Recursos bibliográficos en papel y digitales -
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» Resultado: 3 registros
| Registro 1 de 3 | |
| Autor: | Reitman, David - |
| Título: | Partial Ownership Arrangements and the Potential for Collusion |
| Fuente: | Journal of Industrial Economics. v.42, n.3. Blackwell Publishers |
| Páginas: | pp. 313-22 |
| Año: | Sept. 1994 |
| Resumen: | Firms can form partial ownership arrangements by purchasing claims to competitor’s profits in order to commit to less aggressive competition. These arrangements can increase profits for all firms in the industry even in the absence of synergies. Using a conjectural variations model, the author shows that, with more than two symmetric firms engaged in quantity competition or with more cooperative conjectures, partial ownership arrangements are never individually rational for all participants. Conversely, with conjectures that lead to more rivalrous equilibria than Cournot, there exist individually rational partial ownership arrangements with any number of firms in the industry. |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA J + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 2 de 3 | |
| Autor: | Png, I-P-L - Reitman, David - |
| Título: | Service Time Competition |
| Fuente: | RAND Journal of Economics. v.25, n.4. RAND |
| Páginas: | pp. 619-34 |
| Año: | winter 1994 |
| Resumen: | How can two physically identical gasoline stations differentiate themselves? In this article, the authors develop and test a model of service time competition: some stations set higher prices and thereby offer shorter queues, whereas others offer lower price and longer queues. The authors find that retail demand is sensitive to service time: customers are, on average, willing to pay about 1 percent more for a 6 percent reduction in congestion. Consistent with the service time hypothesis, prices are more dispersed at stations facing more direct competition. |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA R + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 3 de 3 | |
| Autor: | Reitman, David - |
| Título: | Stock Options and the Strategic Use of Managerial Incentives |
| Fuente: | American Economic Review. v.83, n.3. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: | pp. 513-24 |
| Año: | June 1993 |
| Resumen: | In Cournot-based oligopoly models there is an incentive for firms to pursue overly aggressive behavior, resulting in prices and profits below those of the Cournot equilibrium. Compensating managers in proportion to a combination of profits and sales provides one mechanism through which aggressive behavior emerges. However, when the profit component of managerial compensation comes in the form of stock options, the aggressive behavior is restrained or even eliminated in equilibrium. This result relies only on the nonlinearity of the stock option; generalizations to other forms of compensation are discussed. |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
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