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» Resultado: 2 registros
| Registro 1 de 2 | |
| Autor: | Rodriguez-Clare, Andres - |
| Título: | Multinationals, Linkages, and Economic Development |
| Fuente: | American Economic Review. v.86, n.4. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: | pp. 852-73 |
| Año: | Sept. 1996 |
| Resumen: | This paper explores how multinationals affect underdeveloped regions through the generation of linkages. It is shown that the linkage effect of multinationals on the host country is more likely to be favorable when the good that multinationals produce uses intermediate goods intensively, when there are large costs of communication between the headquarters and the production plant, and when the home and host countries are not too different in terms of the variety of intermediate goods produced. If these conditions are reversed, then multinationals could even hurt the developing economy, formalizing the idea that multinationals may create enclave economies within developing countries. |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 2 de 2 | |
| Autor: | Maggi, Giovanni - Rodriguez-Clare, Andres - |
| Título: | Costly Distortion of Information in Agency Problems |
| Fuente: | RAND Journal of Economics. v.26, n.4. RAND |
| Páginas: | pp. 675-89 |
| Año: | winter 1995 |
| Resumen: | Anecdotal evidence suggests that agents often spend resources distorting information transmitted to principals. We present a model where costly information distortion emerges as equilibrium behavior. The information structure we focus on is intermediate between (and encompasses) the cases of private information and public information: the agent can falsify the privately observed state at some cost. Although the principal can design contracts that induce no falsification, these may involve excessive information rents: falsification can be beneficial in spite of the waste of resources involved, because it helps reduce information rents. We examine how optimal contract and equilibrium payoffs change as the information structure ranges from private to public information. |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA R + datos de Fuente |
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