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Recursos bibliográficos en papel y digitales -
- libros, artículos de revistas,
ponencias de eventos, etc. -
» Resultado:
5 registros
| Registro 1 de 5 |
| Autor: |
Persson, Torsten - Roland, Gérard - Tabellini, Guido - |
| Título: |
Comparative politics and public finance |
| Fuente: |
Journal of Political Economy. v.108, n.6. The University of Chicago Press |
| Páginas: |
pp. 1121-1161 |
| Año: |
Dec. 2000 |
| Resumen: |
We propose a model with micropolitical foundations to contrast different political regimes. Compared to a parliamentary regime, the institutions of a presidential-congressional regime produce fewer incentives for legislative cohesion but more separation of powers. These differences are reflected in the size and composition of government spending. A parliamentary regime has redistribution toward a majority, less underprovision of public goods, and more rents to politicians; a presidential-congressional regime has redistribution toward powerful minorities, more underprovision of public goods, but less rents to politicians. The size of government is smaller under a presidential regime. This last prediction is consistent with cross-country data |
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA J + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 2 de 5 |
| Autor: |
Lau, Lawrence J. - Qian, Yingyi - Roland, Gerard - |
| Título: |
Reform without losers : an interpretation of China’s dual-track approach to transition |
| Fuente: |
Journal of Political Economy. v.108, n.1. The University of Chicago Press |
| Páginas: |
pp. 120-143 |
| Año: |
Feb. 2000 |
| Resumen: |
This paper develops a simple model to analyze the dual-track approach to market liberalization as a mechanism for implementing efficient Pareto-improving economic reform, that is, reform achieving efficiency without creating losers. The approach, based on the continued enforcement of the existing plan while simultaneously liberalizing the market, can be understood as a method for making implicit lump-sum transfers to compensate potential losers of the reform. The model highlights the critical roles of enforcement of the plan for achieving Pareto improvement and full liberalization of the market track for achieving efficiency. We examine how the dual-track approach has worked in product and labor market liberalization in China |
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA J + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 3 de 5 |
| Autor: |
Qian, Yingyi - Roland, Gerard - |
| Título: |
Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint |
| Fuente: |
American Economic Review. v.88, n.5. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: |
pp. 1143-62 |
| Año: |
Dec. 1998 |
| Resumen: |
The government’s incentives to bail out inefficient projects are determined by the trade-off between political benefits and economic costs, the latter depending on the decentralization of government. Two effects of federalism are derived: first, fiscal competition among local governments under factor mobility increases the opportunity costs of bailout and, thus, serves as a commitment device (the ’competition effect’); second, monetary centralization, together with fiscal decentralization, induces a conflict of interests and, thus, may harden budget constraints and reduce inflation (the ’checks and balance effect’). The authors’ analysis is used to interpret China’s recent experience of transition to a market economy. |
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 4 de 5 |
| Autor: |
Bolton, Patrick - Roland, Gerard - |
| Título: |
Distributional Conflicts, Factor Mobility, and Political Integration |
| Fuente: |
American Economic Review. v.86, n.2. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: |
pp. 99-104 |
| Año: |
May 1996 |
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 5 de 5 |
| Autor: |
Dewatripont, Mathias - Roland, Gerard - |
| Título: |
The Design of Reform Packages under Uncertainty |
| Fuente: |
American Economic Review. v.85, n.5. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: |
pp. 1207-23 |
| Año: |
Dec. 1995 |
| Resumen: |
The authors present a model of large-scale economic reforms, modeled on the transition process in Eastern Europe, with aggregate and individual uncertainty concerning the outcome of reforms. The government is assumed to choose the speed and sequencing of reforms. The authors compare big-bang strategies with gradualist reform packages. They show that gradualist reform packages may be easier to get started, optimal sequencing of reforms should aim at creating constituencies for further reforms, and gradualism may generate a higher investment response because of a lower option value of waiting than would a big-bang approach. |
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
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