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Recursos bibliográficos en papel y digitales -
- libros, artículos de revistas,
ponencias de eventos, etc. -
» Resultado:
118 registros
| Registro 1 de 118 |
| Autor: |
Buccella, D. - Fanti, L. - Gori, L. |
| Título: |
’Green’ managerial delegation theory |
| Fuente: |
Environment and Development Economics. v.27, n.3. Beijer Institute of Ecological Economics; Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences |
| Páginas: |
pp. 223-249 |
| Año: |
jun. 2022 |
| Resumen: |
This article develops a non-cooperative game with managerial quantity-setting firms in which owners choose whether to delegate output and abatement decisions to managers through a contract based on emissions (conventionally denoted as ’green’ delegation, GD) instead of sales (sales delegation, SD), and the government levies an emissions tax to incentivise firms’ emissions-reduction actions. First, it compares the Nash equilibrium outcomes between GD and SD and then contrasts them also with profit maximisation (PM). A plethora of Nash equilibria emerges, especially in the case GD versus PM (the ’green delegation game’), depending on the public awareness toward environmental quality, ranging from the coordination game to the ’green’ prisoner’s dilemma. Second, though the contract under GD incentivises managers for emissions, the environmental damage is lower than under SD. This is because the optimal tax more than compensates the incentive for emissions. These findings suggest that designing GD contracts paradoxically favours environmental quality. |
| Palabras clave: |
EMISIONES DE CARBONO |
IMPUESTOS |
JUEGO DE SIMULACION | |
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA E + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 2 de 118 |
| Autor: |
Weitzel, Matthias - Ghosh, Joydeep - Peterson, Sonja - Pradhan, Basanta K. |
| Título: |
Effects of international climate policy for India: evidence from a national and global CGE model |
| Fuente: |
Environment and Development Economics. v.20, n.4. Beijer Institute of Ecological Economics; Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences |
| Páginas: |
pp. 516-538 |
| Año: |
Aug. 2015 |
| Resumen: |
In order to significantly reduce global carbon emissions, it is necessary also to control CO2 emissions in fast growing emerging economies such as India. The question is how the Indian economy would be affected by including the country in an international climate regime. In this analysis we soft-link a global and a single-country computable general equilibrium model in order to be able to capture distributional issues as well as international repercussions. We analyze different options of transferring revenues from domestic carbon taxes and international transfers to different household types and the effects of different assumptions on exchange rates on transfer payments. Our results show (i) that welfare effects can differ significantly for different household types, which is generally ignored in analyses with global models, and (ii) that these effects are significantly influenced by international price repercussions and by accounting for transfers from international permit sales which is generally ignored in single-country models. |
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA E + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 3 de 118 |
| Autor: |
Lai, Pei-Chun - Bessler, David A. - |
| Título: |
Price discovery between carbonated soft drink manufacturers and retailers: A disaggregate analysis with PC and LiNGAM algorithms |
| Fuente: |
Journal of Applied Economics. v.18, n.1. Universidad del CEMA |
| Páginas: |
pp. 173-198 |
| Año: |
May 2015 |
| Resumen: |
This paper considers the use of two machine learning algorithms to identify the causal relationships among retail prices, manufacturer prices, and number of packages sold. The two algorithms are PC and Linear Non-Gaussian Acyclic Models (LiNGAM). The dataset studied comprises scanner data collected from the retail sales of carbonated soft drinks in the Chicago area. The PC algorithm is not able to assign direction among retail price, manufacturer price and quantity sold, whereas the LiNGAM algorithm is able to decide in every case, i.e., retail price leads manufacturer price and quantity sold. |
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA J + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 4 de 118 |
| Autor: |
Mulenga, Brian P. - Richardson, Robert B. - Tembo, Gelson - Mapemba, Lawrence |
| Título: |
Rural household participation in markets for non-timber forest products in Zambia |
| Fuente: |
Environment and Development Economics. v.19, n.4. Beijer Institute of Ecological Economics; Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences |
| Páginas: |
pp. 487-504 |
| Año: |
Aug. 2014 |
| Resumen: |
Non-timber forest products (NTFPs) support livelihoods in rural communities through provision of food, fuel, materials, medicines and income from sales. We estimated the contribution of NTFPs to rural household income in Zambia, and used a two-stage tobit alternative model to identify the factors associated with participation in NTFP markets. NTFPs accounted for 35 per cent of household income for participating households, second only to trading. Human capital variables and the value of assets were found to be significant determinants of both participation in business activities related to NTFPs and the associated household income, and the poor were more dependent on NTFPs than wealthier households. The effect of average rainfall underscores the role that NTFPs play in providing a safety net during periods of low crop yields. Rural development policies should recognize the role played by NTFPs in rural livelihoods and the need to balance welfare improvement and sustainable forest management. |
| Palabras clave: |
ZONAS RURALES |
PRODUCTORES RURALES |
MERCADO |
CALIDAD DE VIDA |
|
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA E + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 5 de 118 |
| Autor: |
Besfamille, Martin - De Donder, Philippe - Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie |
| Título: |
The Political Economy of the (Weak) Enforcement of Indirect Taxes |
| En: |
Jornadas Internacionales de Finanzas Públicas, 44. Córdoba, 21-23 septiembre 2011 |
| Institución patroc.: |
Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas; Consejo Profesional de Ciencias Económicas de la Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires |
| Ciudad y Editorial: |
Córdoba : UNC |
| Páginas: |
34 p. |
| Año: |
2011 |
| Resumen: |
The objective of this paper is to understand the determinants of the enforcement level of indirect taxation in a positive setting. We build a sequential game where individuals, who diÏer in their willingness to pay for a taxed good, vote over the enforcement level. Firms then compete à la Cournot and choose the fraction of sales taxes to evade. We assume in most of the paper that the tax rate is set exogenously. Voters face the following trade-oÏ: more enforcement increases tax collection but also increases the consumer price of the goods sold in an imperfectly competitive market. We obtain that the equilibriumenforcement level is the onemost-preferred by the individual with the median willingness to pay, that it is not aÏected by the structure of the market (number of firms) and the firms marginal cost, and that it decreases with the resource cost of evasion and with the tax rate. We also compare the enforcement level chosen by majority voting with the utilitarian level. In the last section, we endogenize the tax rate by assuming that individuals vote simultaneously over tax rate and enforcement level. We prove the existence of a Condorcet winner and show that it entails full enforcement (i.e., no tax evasion at equilibrium). The existence of markets with less than full enforcement then depends crucially on the fact that tax rates are not tailored to each market individually. |
| Palabras clave: |
EVASION FISCAL |
COMPETENCIA IMPERFECTA |
|
| Solicitar por: |
MULTI CD 00015/44 |
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