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Recursos bibliográficos en papel y digitales -
- libros, artículos de revistas,
ponencias de eventos, etc. -
» Resultado:
8 registros
| Registro 1 de 8 |
| Autor: |
Lewis, Tracy-R - Sappington, David-E-M - |
| Título: |
Motivating Wealth-Constrained Actors |
| Fuente: |
American Economic Review. v.90, n.4. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: |
pp. 944-60 |
| Año: |
Sept. 2000 |
| Resumen: |
We examine how owners of productive resources (e.g. public enterprises or financial capital) optimally allocate their resources among wealth-constrained operators of unknown ability. Optimal allocations exhibit: (1) shared enterprise profit--the resource owner always shares the operator’s profit; (2) dispersed enterprise ownership--resources are widely distributed among operators of varying ability; (3) limited benefits of competition--the owner may not benefit from increased competition for the resource; and, sometimes (4) diluted incentives for the most capable--more capable operators receive smaller shares of the returns they generate. Implications for privatizations and venture capital arrangements are explored. |
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 2 de 8 |
| Autor: |
Lewis, Tracy-R - Sappington, David-E-M - |
| Título: |
Optimal Capital Structure in Agency Relationships |
| Fuente: |
RAND Journal of Economics. v.26, n.3. RAND |
| Páginas: |
pp. 343-61 |
| Año: |
autumn 1995 |
| Resumen: |
The authors analyze the optimal design of capital structure in agency relationships. When a risk-averse principal controls the agent’s capital structure, she awards a larger equity stake to outsiders the smaller the agent’s productivity. When she controls both the timing and the terms of the agent’s financing, the principal shifts to equityholders all risk associated with stochastic production and with the agent’s unknown productivity. When the principal dictates only the terms of financing, only the former risk is borne by equityholders. When the principal is sufficiently averse to risk, she affords the agent no choice among incentive schemes. |
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA R + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 3 de 8 |
| Autor: |
Sappington, David-E-M (Reviewer) |
| Título: |
Review of: A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation |
| Fuente: |
Journal of Economic Literature. v.32, n.2. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: |
pp. 720-21 |
| Año: |
June 1994 |
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA J + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 4 de 8 |
| Autor: |
Sappington, David-E-M - |
| Título: |
Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships |
| Fuente: |
Journal of Economic Perspectives. v.5, n.2. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: |
pp. 45-66 |
| Año: |
spring 1991 |
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA J + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 5 de 8 |
| Autor: |
Lewis, Tracy-R - Sappington, David-E-M - |
| Título: |
Technological Change and the Boundaries of the Firm |
| Fuente: |
American Economic Review. v.81, n.4. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: |
pp. 887-900 |
| Año: |
Sept. 1991 |
| Resumen: |
The authors examine a firm’s decision either to produce an essential input itself or to hire a subcontractor to produce the input. The authors focus on how this decision is affected by technological change in the industry. In general, cost-reducing technological change leads the firm to produce the input itself more often. The firm’s calculus is shown to depend on whether the subcontractor’s skills are idiosyncratic or transferable. In the latter case, technological progress can even be detrimental to the firm and to society as a whole. |
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
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