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Recursos bibliográficos en papel y digitales - - libros, artículos de revistas,
ponencias de eventos, etc. -
» Resultado:
17 registros
Registro 1 de 17 |
Autor: |
La-Porta, Rafael - Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio - Shleifer, Andrei - |
Título: |
Corporate Ownership around the World |
Fuente: |
Journal of Finance. v.54, n.2. American Finance Association |
Páginas: |
pp. 471-517 |
Año: |
Apr. 1999 |
Resumen: |
The authors use data on ownership structures of large corporations in twenty-seven wealthy economies to identify the ultimate controlling shareholders of these firms. They find that, except in economies with very good shareholder protection, relatively few of these firms are widely held, in contrast to Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means’s (1932) image of ownership of the modern corporation. Rather, these firms are typically controlled by families or the state. Equity control by financial institutions is far less common. The controlling shareholders typically have power over firms significantly in excess of their cash flow rights, primarily through the use of pyramids and participation in management. |
Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA J + datos de Fuente |
Registro 2 de 17 |
Autor: |
Barberis, Nicholas - Shleifer, Andrei - Vishny, Robert |
Título: |
A Model of Investor Sentiment |
Fuente: |
Journal of Financial Economics. v.49, n.3. Elsevier Science |
Páginas: |
pp. 307-43 |
Año: |
Sept. 1998 |
Resumen: |
Recent empirical research in finance has uncovered two families of pervasive regularities: underreaction of stock prices to news such as earnings announcements, and overreaction of stock prices to a series of good or bad news. In this paper, the authors present a parsimonious model of investor sentiment, or of how investors form beliefs, which is consistent with the empirical findings. The model is based on psychological evidence and produces both underreaction and overreaction for a wide range of parameter values. |
Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA J + datos de Fuente |
Registro 3 de 17 |
Autor: |
Shleifer, Andrei - |
Título: |
State versus Private Ownership |
Fuente: |
Journal of Economic Perspectives. v.12, n.4. American Economic Association |
Páginas: |
pp. 133-50 |
Año: |
fall 1998 |
Resumen: |
Private ownership should generally be preferred to public ownership when the incentives to innovate and to contain costs must be strong. In essence, this is the case for capitalism over socialism, explaining the ’dynamic vitality’ of free enterprise. The great economists of the 1930s and 1940s failed to see the dangers of socialism in part because they focused on the role of prices under socialism and capitalism and ignored the enormous importance of ownership as the source of capitalist incentives to innovate. Moreover, the concern that private firms fail to address ’social goals’ can be addressed through government contracting and regulation, without resorting to government ownership. The case for private provision only becomes stronger when competition between suppliers, reputational mechanisms, the possibility of provision by private not-for-profit firms, as well as political patronage and corruption, are brought into play. |
Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA J + datos de Fuente |
Registro 4 de 17 |
Autor: |
Hay, Jonathan-R - Shleifer, Andrei - |
Título: |
Private Enforcement of Public Laws: A Theory of Legal Reform |
Fuente: |
American Economic Review. v.88, n.2. American Economic Association |
Páginas: |
pp. 398-403 |
Año: |
May 1998 |
Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
Registro 5 de 17 |
Autor: |
Shleifer, Andrei - Vishny, Robert-W - |
Título: |
A Survey of Corporate Governance |
Fuente: |
Journal of Finance. v.52, n.2. American Finance Association |
Páginas: |
pp. 737-83 |
Año: |
June 1997 |
Resumen: |
This article surveys research on corporate governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in corporate governance systems around the world. |
Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA J + datos de Fuente |
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