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Recursos bibliográficos en papel y digitales -
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» Resultado: 3 registros
| Registro 1 de 3 | |
| Autor: | Spier, Kathryn-E - Whinston, Michael-D - |
| Título: | On the Efficiency of Privately Stipulated Damages for Breach of Contract: Entry Barriers, Reliance and Renegotiation |
| Fuente: | RAND Journal of Economics. v.26, n.2. RAND |
| Páginas: | pp. 180-202 |
| Año: | summer 1995 |
| Resumen: | Two roles for stipulated damage provisions have been debated in the literature: protecting relationship-specific investments and inefficiently excluding competitors. Aghion and Bolton (1987) formally demonstrate the latter effect in a model without investment or renegotiation. Although introducing renegotiation alone destroys their result, introducing both renegotiation and investment restores it. In particular, if the entrant has market power and the seller’s cost of production is observable but not verifiable, then privately stipulated damages are set at a socially excessive level to facilitate the extraction of the entrant’s surplus. In contrast, if the entrant prices competitively (as typically is assumed in the law and economics literature on breach), then private stipulation is efficient. Whereas a simple legal restriction on the contract corrects for any inefficiency, standard court-imposed remedies do not. |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA R + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 2 de 3 | |
| Autor: | Spier, Kathryn-E - |
| Título: | Pretrial Bargaining and the Design of Fee-Shifting Rules |
| Fuente: | RAND Journal of Economics. v.25, n.2. RAND |
| Páginas: | pp. 197-214 |
| Año: | summer 1994 |
| Resumen: | Legal rules for allocating the private costs of civil litigation, or ’fee-shifting’ rules, provide powerful incentives for settlement. Within the context of a direct-revelation mechanism, the fee-shifting rule that generates the highest probability of settlement bases the allocation of costs upon the proximity of the court’s award to the pretrial announcements. This mechanism resembles Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and other offer-based rules. In a simple extensive-form game, if the litigants have asymmetric information about the level of damages (probability of prevailing), then Rule 68 increases (decreases) the settlement rate. |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA R + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 3 de 3 | |
| Autor: | Perotti, Enrico-C - Spier, Kathryn-E - |
| Título: | Capital Structure as a Bargaining Tool: The Role of Leverage in Contract Renegotiation |
| Fuente: | American Economic Review. v.83, n.5. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: | pp. 1131-41 |
| Año: | Dec. 1993 |
| Resumen: | This paper presents a strategic model of temporarily high leverage. When the repayment of senior claims depends in part upon further investment, shareholders may be able to alter credibly their incentives to invest through an exchange of junior debt for equity and thereby force concessions from senior creditors. The authors focus on the conflict between shareholders and risk-averse workers and show that this strategic use of debt leads to an inefficient allocation of risk. They characterize conditions under which firms will undergo leveraged recapitalizations, their choice of debt instruments, and the dynamics of their capital structure. |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
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