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Recursos bibliográficos en papel y digitales -
- libros, artículos de revistas,
ponencias de eventos, etc. -
» Resultado:
10 registros
| Registro 1 de 10 |
| Autor: |
Scartascin, Carlos - Stein, Ernesto - Tommasi, Mariano - |
| Título: |
Political institutions, intertemporal cooperation, and the quality of public policies |
| Fuente: |
Journal of Applied Economics. v.16, n.1. Universidad del CEMA |
| Páginas: |
pp. 1-32 |
| Año: |
May 2013 |
| Resumen: |
While economists have tended to focus on specific public policies when developing recommendations, the achievement of welfare objectives might depend more on the quality of policies than their content. This paper develops several measures of the qualities of policies across countries, arguing that the quality of public policies depends on each polity’s ability to strike intertemporal transactions necessary to develop and sustain effective policies. The analytical framework developed here indicates that this ability depends on several characteristics of political institutions, such as congressional capabilities, judicial independence, and bureaucratic independence and professionalism. The empirical evidence presented supports this idea. An online appendix is available. |
| Contenido: |
* . |
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA J + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 2 de 10 |
| Autor: |
Blomberg, S. Brock - Frieden, Jeffry - Stein, Ernesto - |
| Título: |
Sustaining fixed rates: the political economy of currency pegs in Latin America |
| Fuente: |
Journal of Applied Economics. v.8, n.2. Universidad del CEMA |
| Páginas: |
pp. 203-225 |
| Año: |
Nov. 2005 |
| Resumen: |
Government exchange rate regime choice is constrained by both political and economic factors. One political factor is the role of special interests: the larger the tradable sectors exposed to international competition, the less likely is the maintenance of a fixed exchange rate regime. Another political factor is electoral: as an election approaches, the probability of the maintenance of a fixed exchange rate increases. We test these arguments with hazard models to analyze the duration dependence of Latin American exchange rate arrangements from 1960 to 1999. We find substantial empirical evidence for these propositions. Results are robust to the inclusion of a variety of other economic and political variables, to different time and country samples, and to different definitions of regime arrangement. Controlling for economic factors, a one percentage point increase in the size of the manufacturing sector is associated with a reduction of six months in the longevity of a country’s currency peg. An im pending election increases the conditional likelihood of staying on a peg by about 8 percent, while the aftershock of an election conversely increases the conditional probability of going off a peg by 4 percent. |
| Palabras clave: |
TIPO DE CAMBIO |
VENTAJA COMPARATIVA |
POLITICA MONETARIA |
ELECCIONES |
ESTUDIO DE CASOS |
|
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA J + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 3 de 10 |
| Autor: |
Druck, Pablo - Morón, Eduardo - Stein, Ernesto - |
| Título: |
The twin risks in the dollarization debate: country and devaluation risks |
| Fuente: |
Documentos de Trabajo UCEMA, n.198. Universidad del CEMA |
| Páginas: |
27 p. |
| Año: |
sept. 2001 |
| Palabras clave: |
DEVALUACION |
DOLARIZACION |
RIESGO PAIS |
|
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA D + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 5 de 10 |
| Autor: |
Stein, Ernesto - |
| Título: |
Reglas macro-fiscales e instituciones presupuestarias |
| En: |
Seminario sobre reglas macro-fiscales, instituciones e instrumentos presupuestarios plurianuales. Buenos Aires, 10-12 mayo 1999 |
| Institución patroc.: |
Argentina; Ministerio de Economía; Secretaría de Hacienda |
| Ciudad y Editorial: |
Buenos Aires : el Ministerio |
| Páginas: |
pp. 79-98 |
| Año: |
2000 |
| Palabras clave: |
PRESUPUESTO |
DEFICIT FISCAL |
EVALUACION |
REGLAS MACRO-FISCALES |
INSTITUCIONES PRESUPUESTARIAS |
EVALUACION PRESUPUESTARIA EFECTIVA | |
| Solicitar por: |
CONGRESOS 00095 |
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