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Recursos bibliográficos en papel y digitales -
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» Resultado: 4 registros
| Registro 1 de 4 | |
| Autor: | Svensson, Lars-E-O - |
| Título: | The First Year of the Eurosystem: Inflation Targeting or Not? |
| Fuente: | American Economic Review. v.90, n.2. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: | pp. 95-99 |
| Año: | May 2000 |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 2 de 4 | |
| Autor: | Svensson, Lars-E-O - |
| Título: | Optimal Inflation Targets, "Conservative" Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts |
| Fuente: | American Economic Review. v.87, n.1. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: | pp. 98-114 |
| Año: | Mar. 1997 |
| Resumen: | Inflation-targeting regimes (like those of New Zealand, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Sweden) are interpreted as having explicit inflation targets and implicit employment targets. Without employment persistence, an ’inflation-target-conservative’ central bank eliminates the inflation bias, mimics an optimal inflation contract, and dominates a Rogoff ’weight-conservative’ central bank. With employment persistence, a state-contingent inflation bias and a stabilization bias also arise. A constant inflation target and a constant inflation contract are still equivalent. A state-contingent inflation target combined with a weight-conservative central bank can achieve the equilibrium corresponding to an optimal rule under commitment. |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 3 de 4 | |
| Autor: | Kotlikoff, Laurence-J - Persson, Torsten - Svensson, Lars-E-O - |
| Título: | Social Contracts as Assets: A Possible Solution to the Time-Consistency Problem |
| Fuente: | American Economic Review. v.78, n.4. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: | pp. 662-77 |
| Año: | Sept. 1988 |
| Resumen: | The authors present a new solution to the time-consistency problem that appears capable of enforcing ex ante policy i n settings where other enforcement mechanisms do not work. The soluti on involves a social contract that specifies the optimal ex ante poli cy and is effectively sold by successive old generations to successiv e young generations, who pay for the social contract through intergen erational transfers. Both old and young generations have an economic incentive to fulfill the social contract. The authors apply the solut ion to show how an equilibrium without excessive capital taxation can be enforced, despite an ongoing temptation to impose ex post capital levies. |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 4 de 4 | |
| Autor: | Svensson, Lars-E-O - |
| Título: | Trade in Risky Assets |
| Fuente: | American Economic Review. v.78, n.3. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: | pp. 375-94 |
| Año: | June 1988 |
| Resumen: | A theory of the international trade pattern in risky assets is developed by applying the law of comparative advantage to asset trade. According to this l aw, there is a tendency for a country to import assets that have rela tively high autarky prices. It is examined how autarky prices are aff ected by international differences in stochastic properties of output /endowments, the rate of time preference, the degree of risk aversion, and subjective beliefs, and how such differences predict overall ca pital account deficits or surpluses as well as the composition of the capital account into trade in specific risky assets. |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
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