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Recursos bibliográficos en papel y digitales -
- libros, artículos de revistas,
ponencias de eventos, etc. -
» Resultado:
6 registros
| Registro 1 de 6 |
| Autor: |
Persson, Torsten - Roland, Gérard - Tabellini, Guido - |
| Título: |
Comparative politics and public finance |
| Fuente: |
Journal of Political Economy. v.108, n.6. The University of Chicago Press |
| Páginas: |
pp. 1121-1161 |
| Año: |
Dec. 2000 |
| Resumen: |
We propose a model with micropolitical foundations to contrast different political regimes. Compared to a parliamentary regime, the institutions of a presidential-congressional regime produce fewer incentives for legislative cohesion but more separation of powers. These differences are reflected in the size and composition of government spending. A parliamentary regime has redistribution toward a majority, less underprovision of public goods, and more rents to politicians; a presidential-congressional regime has redistribution toward powerful minorities, more underprovision of public goods, but less rents to politicians. The size of government is smaller under a presidential regime. This last prediction is consistent with cross-country data |
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA J + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 2 de 6 |
| Autor: |
Persson, Torsten - Tabellini, Guido - |
| Título: |
Monetary Cohabitation in Europe |
| Fuente: |
American Economic Review. v.86, n.2. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: |
pp. 111-16 |
| Año: |
May 1996 |
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 3 de 6 |
| Autor: |
Persson, Torsten - Tabellini, Guido - |
| Título: |
Is Inequality Harmful for Growth? |
| Fuente: |
American Economic Review. v.84, n.3. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: |
pp. 600-621 |
| Año: |
June 1994 |
| Resumen: |
Is inequality harmful for growth? The authors suggest that it is. In a society where distributional conflict is important, political decisions produce economic policies that tax investment and growth-promoting activities in order to redistribute income. The paper formulates a theoretical model that captures this idea. The model’s implications are supported by the evidence. Both historical panel data and postwar cross-sections indicate a significant and large negative relation between inequality and growth. This relation is only present in democracies. |
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 4 de 6 |
| Autor: |
Cukierman, Alex - Edwards, Sebastian - Tabellini, Guido - |
| Título: |
Seigniorage and Political Instability |
| Fuente: |
American Economic Review. v.82, n.3. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: |
pp. 537-55 |
| Año: |
June 1992 |
| Resumen: |
The importance of seigniorage relative to other sources of government revenue differs markedly across countries. This paper tries to explain this regularity by studying a political model of tax reform. The model implies that countries with a more unstable and polarized political system will have more inefficient tax structures and, thus, will rely more heavily on seigniorage. This prediction of the model is tested on cross-sectional data for seventy countries. The authors find that, after controlling for other variables, political instability is positively associated with seigniorage. |
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 5 de 6 |
| Autor: |
Tabellini, Guido - Alesina, Alberto - |
| Título: |
Voting on the Budget Deficit |
| Fuente: |
American Economic Review. v.80, n.1. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: |
pp. 37-49 |
| Año: |
Mar. 1990 |
| Resumen: |
This paper analyzes a model in which a group of rational individuals votes over the composition and time profile of public spending. All voters agree that a balanced budget is ex ante optimal. However, if there is disagreement between current and future majorities, a balanced budget is not a political equilibrium under majority rule. Under certain conditions, a majority of the voters favors a budget deficit, and the equilibrium deficit is larger the greater is the polarization among voters. |
| Solicitar por: |
HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
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