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Recursos bibliográficos en papel y digitales -
- libros, artículos de revistas,
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» Resultado: 3 registros
| Registro 1 de 3 | |
| Autor: | Bernheim, B-Douglas - Whinston, Michael-D - |
| Título: | Incomplete Contracts and Strategic Ambiguity |
| Fuente: | American Economic Review. v.88, n.4. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: | pp. 902-32 |
| Año: | Sept. 1998 |
| Resumen: | Why are observed contracts so often incomplete in the sense that they leave contracting parties’ obligations vague or unspecified? Traditional answers to this question invoke transaction costs or bounded rationality. In contrast, the authors argue that such incompleteness is often an essential feature of a well-designed contract. Specifically, once some aspects of performance are unverifiable, it is often optimal to leave other verifiable aspects of performance unspecified. The authors explore the conditions under which this occurs, and investigate the structure of optimal contracts when these conditions are satisfied. |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 2 de 3 | |
| Autor: | Spier, Kathryn-E - Whinston, Michael-D - |
| Título: | On the Efficiency of Privately Stipulated Damages for Breach of Contract: Entry Barriers, Reliance and Renegotiation |
| Fuente: | RAND Journal of Economics. v.26, n.2. RAND |
| Páginas: | pp. 180-202 |
| Año: | summer 1995 |
| Resumen: | Two roles for stipulated damage provisions have been debated in the literature: protecting relationship-specific investments and inefficiently excluding competitors. Aghion and Bolton (1987) formally demonstrate the latter effect in a model without investment or renegotiation. Although introducing renegotiation alone destroys their result, introducing both renegotiation and investment restores it. In particular, if the entrant has market power and the seller’s cost of production is observable but not verifiable, then privately stipulated damages are set at a socially excessive level to facilitate the extraction of the entrant’s surplus. In contrast, if the entrant prices competitively (as typically is assumed in the law and economics literature on breach), then private stipulation is efficient. Whereas a simple legal restriction on the contract corrects for any inefficiency, standard court-imposed remedies do not. |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA R + datos de Fuente |
| Registro 3 de 3 | |
| Autor: | Whinston, Michael-D - |
| Título: | Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion |
| Fuente: | American Economic Review. v.80, n.4. American Economic Association |
| Páginas: | pp. 837-59 |
| Año: | Sept. 1990 |
| Resumen: | In recent years, the "leverage theory" of tied good sales has faced heavy and influential criticism. In an important sense, though, the models used by its critics are actually incapable of addressing the leverage theory’s central concerns. Here the author reconsiders the leverage hypothesis and argues that tying can indeed serve as a mechanism for leveraging market power. The mechanism through which this leverage occurs, its profitability, and its welfare implications are discussed in detail. |
| Solicitar por: | HEMEROTECA A + datos de Fuente |
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